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Institutionalism has become firmly entrenched in legal schol­
arship.1 In particular, institutionalism has become a �owerful and 
alluring theoretic for international law scholarship. Given the 
use of institutionalism in international law scholarship, and the 
importance of international economic organizations to theory and 
practice, it is natural that institutionalism has been prominently 
used to scrutinize international economic organizations, including 
the World Trade Organization. 
When international law scholars utilize the tools of institu­
tionalism, however, they tend to draw only from two sources. 
International relation's regime theory3 has entered the main­
stream of international law discourse, and has been applied di­
rectly to the World Trade Organization. Institutional econom­
ics,4 particularly transaction cost analysis, has also appeared in 
international law discourse, and has been directly applied to or­
ganizations that include the World Trade Organization. 
Regime theory and institutional economics, however, do not 
exhaust the universe of sources of institutional analysis. Virtually 
• Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the U niver­
sity of Pennsylvania. A.B. Harvard; J .D ., LL.M. Duke. Research for this Arti­
cle was generously supported by a grant from the Department of Legal Studies. 
1 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and 
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1996) 
(predicting that institutionalism may bring a rapprochement between law and 
economics and "outsider" schools such as femimst legal theory, which will cre­
ate a unified theory for legal scholarship) . 
2 See William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal 
Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 227, 229 (noting the increasing use 
of institutionalism in international law scholarship); see aLso infra notes 9-60 
and accompanying text (discussing the use of institutionalism in international 
law scholarship) . 
3 See discussion infra notes 9-36 and accompanying text. 
4 See discussion infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text. 
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all of the social sciences are experiencing a revival in institutional­
ism.) In particular, this Article examines two schools of institu­
tionalism: historical institutionalism, 6 vvhich is a ?roduct of po­
litical science; and sociological institutionalism, which is a 
product of sociology. Each of these iterations of institutionalism 
differs in critical ways from regime theory or institutional eco­
nomics. Each also provides a rigorous framework for analyzing 
international law and for scrutinizing the World Trade Organiza­
tion.  To date, however, neither international law scholars nor 
trade scholars have availed themselves of these two means of in­
qmry. 
This lack of use raises an interesting question, which is ana­
lyzed in this Article: why have international law scholars and 
trade scholars not utilized historical institutionalism or sociologi­
cal institutionalism? Ironically, historical and sociological institu­
tionalism themselves provide insights. Historical institutionalism 
emphasizes path dependency: a brief review of the unfolding of 
institutional thought in international law scholarship reveals how 
regime theory and institutional economics obtained an advantage 
over rival schools. Similarly, sociological institutionalism empha­
sizes cultural factors in the creation or alteration of institutions: 
the culture of legal scholarship may not be conducive to these ver­
sions of institutionalism. 
The implications for both trade scholarship and the World 
Trade Organization as institutions are significant. Understanding 
why trade scholarship has not incorporated historical and socio­
logical institutionalism may explain why trade scholarship has not 
established linkages with other potentially instructive schools of 
thought , such as business ethics. Moreover, understanding the 
World Trade Organization as an institution8 with a history and 
embedded in culture may explain why practical l inkages, such as 
5 See Vivien Lowndes, Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Ap­
praisal, 74 PUB. ADMIN. 181, 18 1-82 (1996) (noting the revival in and plethora 
of institutionalisms). 
6 See discussion infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text. 
7 See discussion infra notes 91-120 and accompanying text. 
8 An institution not in the sense of an institute but rather as a bundle of 
rules and procedures. See Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Frame­
work for A nalysis, in SOCIAL RULES: ORIGIN; CHi\RACTER; LOGIC; CHA!'-JGE 
189, 190 (David Braybrooke ed., 1996) (distin�uishing institutions-"the rdes 
of the game" from organizations- "the players"). 
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the linkage between trade and human rights, are difficult to ac­
complish. 
Before discussing the possibilities that accrue from understand­
ing the relationship between trade scholarship and historical and 
sociological institutionalism,  the current �linkage between trade 
scholarship and institutionalism must be explained. This article 
begins with a discussion of institutionalisms that have been used 
to analyze the World Trade Organization. 
1 .  INSTITUTIONALISM AND ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE 
0RGANIZA TION 
Two iterations of institutionalism predominate in interna­
tional law scholarship, and these two have resulted in the only 
significant institutional analysis of international economic organi­
zations such as the Y'// orld Trade Organization. These two are re­
gime theory and institutional economics. Each is distinct from 
the other, and each shall be discussed in turn. 
1.1. Regime Theory 
Kenneth Abbott introduced the international relations school 
of regime theory9 to international law scholarship in an article 
published in the Yale Jowrnal of International Law in 1989.10 Ab­
bott noted the schism between international relations theory and 
international law theory, and attributed this schism to differences 
in the theoretical approaches dominating each discipline.  1 1  Inter­
national relations theory was, at that time, dominated by the 
school of realism, which "see[s] a world of states obsessed with 
9 Regime theory sometimes also uses the appellation "institutionalism." 
John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International 
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 140 (1997) . 
Given the number of different types of institutionalism that are discussed m 
this Article, this Article will use the older appellation "regime theory" when 
discussin£; international relations theory, so as to avoid confusion with other 
types of mstitutionalism. 
1° Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus 
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); see Anne-Marie 
Slaughter [Burley], Book Review, 89AM J. INT'L L. 454, 454 (1995) (reviewing 
VOLKES RITTBERGER, REGilv1E THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1993)) (stating that Kenneth Abbott "first broached the connection between 
regime theory and international law"). 
11 See Abbott, supra note 10, at 337-38; see also FRANCIS ANTHOl\.TY BOYLE, 
WORLD POLITICS ;\ND INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-60 (1985) (discussing the 
schism and criticizing international law scholarship). 
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their power vis-a-vis other states," and in which international law 
• - ,, • 1 d 
. 
" 17 I . 1 l h h 1s mere · wmaow ressmg. - nternatwna aw, on t e ot er 
hand, was dominated by a rather moribund positivism, with a 
goal to describe international law as it is rather than as a theoreti-
1 13 ca construct . 
Abbott perceived the possibility of rapprochement between 
international relations theory and international legal scholarship 
in a new school of thought within the discipline of international 
12 Abbott, supra note 10, at 337-38; see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS 
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 4-5 (4th ed. 1967) 
(arguin� that the only relevant law is the "law of politics") ; Richard A .  Falk, The Re.evance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International 
Law: An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
133, 138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds . ,  1968) (criticizing interna­
tional law as a "repository of legal rationalizations") ;  see also Ann-Marie Slaugh­
ter [Burley], Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic 
La'w, 10 AM. U. J .  INT'LL. & POL'Y 717 ,  721-22 (1995) (noting that the realist 
school dominated international relations theory for "virtually the past two mil­
lennia, from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau") . 
Slaughter [Burley] summarizes realism in three principles: states are the 
pertinent actors in international relations, states are rational actors who seek 
power, and the organizing principle of international relations is anarchy. Id. at 
722. She cautions, however, that this simple summary does not fully capture 
the complexities or varieties of the school of realism. !d. at 727. More fulsome 
discussions can be found in classic realist texts such as GEORGE KENNAN, 
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1 900-1950 (195 1) or MORGENTHAU, supra. 
13 Positivism in international law posits three principles: all sovereign 
states are equal and independent, international law consists only of those rules 
that states have consented to follow, and states are the only actors in the inter­
national arena. See L. OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21 (4th ed. 
1 928) (setting out the principles of positivism in international legal scholarship) ; 
H. Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International Law, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 1 06-07 (1927) \Same) ; see also Sol Picciano, Networks in Intemational Economic Inte­
gration: Fragmented States and the Dilemma of Neo-Liberalism, 17 J. INT'L L. & 
Bus. 10 14, 10 18  (1996) (noting that both legal positivism and international rela­
tions theory realism are state centered) . Positivism has long been castigated for 
its detrimental effect on international legal theory. See, e.g. , Roscoe Pound, 
Philosophical 17Jeory and International Law, I BIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA 73 , 87-88 
(1923) Oaunching a blistering attack on fositivism in international legal scholar­
ship/ ; Phillip R. Trimble, Internationa Law, World Order, and Critical Legal 
Stuaies, 42 STAN. L. REV.  8 1 1 ,  8 1 9  ( 1990) (decrying "sterile positivism" in inter­
national law scholarship) . Nonetheless, positivism "still dominates the profes­
sion." BOYLE, supra note 1 1 , at 1 8 .  David Kennedy notes the predominance of 
positivism, but also calls attention to "new streams" of international law schol­
arship. David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International 
Law: A Bibliography, 35  HARV. INT'L L.J. 417,  4 1 8  (1994) (noting "a dramatic 
increase during the past two decades in the volume of scholarly work that aims 
to rethink the foundations of international law and to respond to recent trends 
in political, social, and legal theory"). " 
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relations theory. That school of thought is regime theory. Re­
gime theory originated as a reaction to an explanatory failure of 
realism. Realism posits a chaotic and competitive world. 14 The 
realist explanation for the existence of international organizations 
in such a hostile environment is that such organizations are im­
posed on other states by the most powerful states. 15 Under such a 
construct, however, the decline of U.S. hegemony in the 1970s 
and 1980s should have meant the end of international organiza­
tions. However, it did not .16 This explanatory gap was filled by a 
subgroup of international relations theorists who study interna­
tional organizations .17 These subspecialists recognized that it is 
not simply states that determine international outcomes; states 
operate and interact through the rules and procedures of regimes. 
These regimes are maintained by the states because they are valu­
able to the states. They reduce the costs of making transactions 
among states, increase the quality and availability of information, 
legitimize and delegitimize behaviors of states, and facilitate reci­
procity among states. 1 8 In short, regimes matter, and offer an ana­
lytic through which international behavior can be studied. 
Abbott saw in regime theory "a long-overdue opportunity to 
re-integrate [international legal scholarship] and [international re­
lations theory] . " 19 International legal scholarship brings to there­
lationship its experience in rules and institutions. International 
relations theory, on the other hand, offers international legal 
scholarship an analytic by which it can escape the "narrow posi-
14 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 12,  at 25-26 (describing international 
politics as "a struggle for power") . 
15 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND 
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 8-10 (1984) ("[F]or Realists . . . 
the early postwar regimes rested on the political hegemony of the United 
States .") ; see also Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 
I!'J"T'L ORG. 579 (1985) (setting out and refuting the realist hegemony explana­
uon) . 
16 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: 
An  A nalysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 859 (1995) 
(pointing out that the GATT and IMF continued to exen great influence afr:er 
the decline of U.S. hegemony) . 
17 See Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organiza­
tion: A State of the Art on an A rt of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986) 
(recounting a history of the study of international organizations) . 
18 KEOHAf,fE, supm note 15, at 244 (attributing accord to "compiementary 
interests, which make cert:iin forms of cooperation potentially benefic ial ") . 
19 Abbott , supra note 10, at 338. 
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tivism" in which it is trapped.20 Each school obviousiy has poten­
tial benefits for the other. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley amolified Abbott's ideas in an 
article published in 1993.21 Burley's,.approach is much different 
than i\.bbott's. Abbott explains, in extreme detail, the concept 
and mechanics of regime theory.22 Burley, on the other hand, 
concentrates on a detailed intellectual history of the relationship 
between international relations theory and international law 
scholarship.23 Burley reaches two conclusions. First, she notes 
that the convergence of regime theory and international law 
scholarship creates opportunities for interdisciplinary collabora­
tion.24 Second, Burley concludes that regime theory "remains 
theoretically inadequate in many ways."b Specifically, she faults 
regime theory for its inability to explain the creation of regimes, 
and for its failure to account for the relationship between the in­
dividual and the state.26 She offers the "Liberal Theory" as a doc­
trinal alternative to both realism/positivism and regime theory.27 
20 !d. at 339-40 . 
21 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993). Burley's article 
evokes a reaction similar to that elicited by Abbott 's art icle. See, e.g. , Setear, 
supra note 9, at 139 n . 1  ( 1997) (noting that Burley's article represents "the best 
summary of the trends and counter-trends in the relationsh�- between interna­
tional relations theory and international legal scholarship" ; Richard L. Wil­
liamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonpro iferation Regime to 
Impede Advanced ProLiferation, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 7 1 ,  76 n .8  (1995) 
(discussing Burley's article as "an excellent analysis of contemporary interna­
tional relations theory"). 
72 - See Abbott, supra note 10, at 342-404. 
23 See Burley, supra note 2 1 ,  at 207-20 (describing the 'postwar trajectory' of  
international relations theory) . 
24 See id. at 222. Specifically, Burley suggests collaboration on distinguish­
ing legal regimes from nonlegal regimes, studying organizational design, study­
ing the phenomenon of compliance with international rules, and undertaking a 
normat1ve inquiry into international ethics. See id. at 222-24. 
25 !d. at 225. 
26 See id. at 225-26. Burley also specifically faults regime theory for its fail­
ure to explain peace among democratic nations; this, however, is more an ex­
ample of regime theory's weakness than a general criticism. See id.; see also 
Bruce Russett, Politics and ALternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, 
TheYefore More Peac�{ttl, World, in ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 107, 111 (Burns H .  Weston ed. ,  1990) (discussing a 
number of studies that show that democratic nations rarely go to war with one 
another). 
77 R ' B ' . h h h ' - "b - nur!ey, supra note 21, at 227. uney recogmzes t .at t 1e sc O<)J ot !! er-
alism encompasses a number of constructs, but suggests that three core assump-
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l.,_yotwithstanding Burley's criticism, Abbott's suggestion that 
international legal scholarship borrow from regime theory has 
created a cottage industry in institutionalism. Scholars such as 
Abbott, Burley, Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, Frank Garcia, 
John Setear, and Edwin Smith have used institutionalism to ex­
plain and analyze a variety of public international law issues.28 
Indeed, :Michael Reisman has characterized institutionalism as 
h . h U . d S "29 I . . "t e current rage m t e nlte tates . t 1s 1mportant to note, 
however, that although many legal scholars use the broad term in­
stitutionalism, the roots of their analyses lie in the regime theory 
- . . 1 1 . 30 o± mternatwna re atwns. 
Regime theory has also been used to analyze the World Trade 
Organization. In an article published in 1995, Richard Shell ex­
tensively utilizes realism, regime theory and liberalism to scruti­
nize the World Trade Organization.3 1 In particular, Shell uses re-
tions are common to the school: the fundamental actors in politics are mem­
bers of society (whether individuals are privately constituted groups) , all gov­
ernments represent some segment of domestic society, and the behavior of 
states depends not on power relationships or institutional constraints but in­
stead on what the state wants. See id. at 227-28 .  Burley relies heavily on an un­
published manuscript by Andrew Moravcsik. For accessible versions of Moravcsik's writing, see Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the Euro­
pean Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentafist Approach, 3 1  J. COMMON 
M.-KT. STUD. 473 (1993) ,  in which Moravcsik particularly applies the concept 
that a state's actions are determined more by its gcals and preferences than by 
relative power distributions among states or by mstitutional constraints upon 
them, and Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Interzovernmentalism and Integration: A 
Rejoinder, 33 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 61 1 (1995) , in which Moravcsik defends 
liber�ism as _a theory, and posits that it is necessary for understanding Euro­
pean mtegratwn. 
28 See Kenneth W. Abbott ,  "Trust But Verify": The Production of Infonna­
tion in A nns Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 1 (1993) ; Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security 
and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 9 1  AM . J. INT'L L. 26 
(1997) ; Frank J. Garcia, Decision making and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the A mericas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 1 8  MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 
( 1997) ; Setear, supra note 9; Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obliga­
tions: Anns Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549 (1991) . The writings 
of Abbott, Burley and Smith are summarized in Setear, supra note 9, at 1 42-47. 
29 W. Michael Reisman, Book Review, 85 AM . J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1991 ) .  
30 Each of the scholars discussed in footnote 28 mention Abbott's 1989 ar­
ticle as a starting point for institutional analysis. See Brunnee & T oope, supra 
note 28, at 33 n.43; Garcia, supra note 28,  at 361 n.1 5 ,  Setear, supra note 9, at 
140 n.l; Smith, supra note 28,  at 1584 n.156. 
31 G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An 
Andysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) . Shell makes 
explicit the line3.ge of his analysis by acknowledging his artide's "particular 
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gime theory to explain one of the most intriguing aspects of the 
\vorld Trade Organization: the potential legalism of its dispute 
1 32 I . . . d 1. . setLement process. n an mterestmg companson an app 1catwn 
of both realism and regime theory, Shell explains the transforma-· 
tion of dispute settlement in the global body as a paradigm shift 
from realism to regime theory. He convincingly demonstrates 
how this paradigm shift reflected real world changes that caused 
states to transform, the dispute settlement process into a more le­
galistic institution.-'3 Shell is not, however, completely satisfied 
with regime theory as an explanation for the World Trade Or­
ganization, because he finds regime theory lacking in its ability to 
explain the relationship between institutions and the preferences 
of individuals.34 Therefore, he accepts regime theory as an expla­
nation of the World Trade Organization as it is but turns to liber­
alism for an explanation of the World Trade Organization as he 
predicts, and hopes, that it wil l  become.35 Shell's facile use of the 
debt to the work of Kenneth Abbott and Ann-Marie Slaughter [Burley] ." !d. at 
834 n.21. 
32 The dispute settlement _process of the World Trade Organization has 
evoked a significant amount of scholarly attention. See, e.g. , Kenneth W. Ab­
bott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-Interests Sys­
tem of justice, 1992 COLUM . Bus. L. REv. 111; Claudto Cocuzza & Andrea 
Forabosco, A re States Relinqu ishing Their Sovereign Rights? The GA IT Dispute 
Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J .  INT'L & COMP. L. 161 
(1996); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard 
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J .  INT'L L. 193 
(1996); Thom;:�.s J .  Dillon, Jr. ,  The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Or­
der for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J .  INT'L L. 349 (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Insti­
tutional Misfits: The GAIT, the IC], & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J .  
INT'L L.  1043 (1994); David A .  Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to 
International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J .  INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 
129 (1995); David W. Leebron, A n  Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 
COLUM . J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 14-16 (1995); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies 
Along With R ights: Institutional Reform in the New GAIT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 
477, 479 (1994); Philil? M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 
658 (1996); Curtis Re1tz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996); Matthew Schaefer, National Re­
view of W'TO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced 
�VJO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J .  LEGAL COMMENT . 307 (1996); C.  
O'Neal Taylor, The L imits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the �Vorld Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 V AND. J .  TR.A.NSNAT'L L. 209 
(1997). 
33 See Shell, supra note 31, at 895-98. Shell also discusses an efficient market 
model, which he discards in favor of regime theory. See id. at 897. 
34 !d. at 90 1-903; cf supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (relating to 
Slaughter [Burley]'s criticism of regime theory) . 
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three schools is an excellent example of theoretical international 
lavr scholarship, and also demonstrates the value of a regime the­
ory based analysis of the World Trade Organization. 
In short, the essence of regime theory is that in international 
or transnationae6 relations, regimes matter. Institutions facilitate 
the prediction, planning and execution of international actions 
and form the basis on which states or  other international actors 
may cooperate .  . They constrain the actions of international ac­
tors, who voluntarily adhere to institutions because it is easier or 
more effective to do so than not to do so . Institutions persist in  a 
self-interested world because they have value to international ac­
tors. As a theoretic framework, international law scholars have 
borrowed from the regime theory .  The use of regime theory has 
included analysis of the World Trade Organization, where regime 
theory has been used productively and plausibly, but not to the 
complete satisfaction of the scholar who first applied it as an ana­
lytical tool. 
1.2. Institutional Economics 
The second form of institutionalism that has worked its way 
into legal scholarship is institutional economics. Given the pre­
dominance of law and economics and the nominal fealty paid by 
most legal scholars to efficiency,37 it may not seem surprising that 
economic institutionalism has found a niche in legal scholarship . 
However, in the realm of international law, this development is 
actually noteworthy. Unlike other branches of legal scholarship, 
35 Shell, supra note 3 1 ,  at 9 1 1-15 (explaining an international law developed 
by "citizen-sponsored, nongovernmental organizations") . 
36 A small number of regime theorists argue that the theory is applicable to 
non-state as well as state actors. See, e.g. , SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND 
MARKETS 200 (1988) ; Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public 
and Private International Regimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94 (Volker Rittberger ed. ,  1993) ; see also 
Philip M.  Nichols , Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organiza­
tion, 17 U. PA. T. INT'L ECON. L. 851 ,  876-77 (1996) (suggesting that interna­
tional legal schofarship does not need to limit itself in the application of regime 
theory to state actors) . 
37 See Richard A. Westin, When One-Eyed A ccountants are Kings: A Primer 
on ivficroeconomics, Income Taxes and the Shibboleth of Efficiency, 69 :MINN. L. 
REV. 1099 (1985) (noting the use and overuse of economic concepts in legal 
' 1 • • ) scl101arstup . 
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international law scholarship has not been the subject of large 
f . 1 . 38 amounts o economic ana ys1s . 
Institutional economics39 is a response to a perceived flaw in 
neo-classical economics. Neo-classical economics bases its theo­
retical models on the actions of rational individuals who act to 
maximize their own well-being (often spoken of as wealth).40 In 
reality, however, consumption decisions are usually made b,x 
households and production decisions are usually made by firms. 1 
38 See Abbott, supra note 10, at 337. Abbott attributes this to the predomi­
nance of positivism in international legal analysis and the corresponding lack of 
interest in explanatory models . Id. Of course, the analytical landscape is not as 
bleak as Abbott depicts . In addition to the use of institutional economic analy­
sis, others have explored the usefulness of economic analysis of international 
law. See, for example, the essays collected in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds . ,  1 997). 
39 Institutional economics is sometimes referred to as "neo-institutional 
economics" in order to distinguish it from the earlier works of Thorstein V e­
blen and John R. Commons . See Douglass C. North, The New Institutional 
Economics, 142 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986). Ironi­
cally, the earlier institutional economics also had a powerful influence on con­
temporary legal theory. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1 927-
1960 19 (1986) (discussing the influence of institutional economics, and of Ve­
blen in particular, on legal realism) . 
40 See Thomas F .  Cotter, Legal Pra�matism and the Law and Economics 
Movement, 84 GEO . L.J. 2071 ,  2 1 15  (1996). These assumptions, of course, have 
been criticized as inaccurate, unverified, or unverifiable. See, e.g. , id. at 2117- 18  
(stating that the assumptions made by the law and economic movement are un­
verifiable and unfalsif1able) ; John J .  Donahue III & Ian Ayres, Posner's Sym­
phony No.3: Thinking A bout the Unthinkable, 39 STAN . L. REV. 791 ,  812 (1987) 
(criticizing law and economic's "clean assumptions") ; John J. Flyn, The "Is" and 
the "Ought" of the Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp. , 7 1  CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1 128-29 (1986) (stating that law and econom­
ics "patterns its methodology after an outmoded notion of 'scientific analysis'" 
and is based "upon a series of unrealistic notions") ; Judith Schenck KoHler, 
Forged A lliances: Law and Literature, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1 374, 1382 (1989) 
(book review) ("law and economics rests on assumptions about human nature 
�hat many, especially trained humanists, find disturbi.r:f) ;  Nancy Levit, Listen­
mg to Tnbal Legends: A n  Essay on Law and the Snentzjzc Method, 58 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 263, 285 (1989) ("Many assumptions of normative law and economics 
are either untested or called into doubt by empirical testing.") . But see Herbert 
Hovenkamp , Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH.  L. REV . 293, 
293 (1992) �responding to some of the criticisms of law and economics' assump­
rions) . Radical individualism has also been the target of criticism by legal 
ethicists. See, e.g. , Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987) (arguing that the organic community has priority over 
individuality) . 
41 See Robert B .  Bates, Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals, in 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 43, 44 Qames M. Acheson 
ed., 1994) ("Given the centrality of radical individualism, it has been pro-
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Neo-classical economics is forced to treat these collectives as if 
they were individuals and to ignore the process that occurs within ' 11 . 42 Ul . 1 h "b. k , " . h the co ect1ve . t1mate y ,  sue lac oox treatment 1s t eo-
retically unsatisfying. Institutional economics is one aspect of the 
resulting interest in how individual choices are made.43 
The school of institutional economics has not yet sorted out 
its principles.44 Nonetheless, its basic assumptions and theory can 
be described. Institutional economics begins with the individual , 
whose behavior is opportunistically rational-"rational" meaning 
that the individual seeks to maximize his or her wealth and to 
minimize costs. Rationality, however, is bounded by the infor­
mation that is available. 45 Obtaining information imposes trans­
action costs on actors. 46 Institutions facilitate the gathering and 
communication of information, thereby reducing transaction 
costs. 47 Indeed, "[ t ]he discriminating alignment hypothesis to 
which transaction cost economics owes much of its predictive 
content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes, 
are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs 
and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost . . 
) ,48 econom1zmg way. 
foundl y embarrassing to modern economics that in its models market forces did 
not rest on the choice of individuals."). 
42 See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS 
IN POSITNE ECONOMICS 3 ,  1 5  ( 1953) (defending "as if" arguments). 
43 Bates, supra note 41, at 45.  
4 4  See James M. Acheson, Introduction, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND IN­
STITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 4 1 ,  at 1 ,  6 ("Institutional economics is 
moving so rapidly that no commonly agreed set of principles has emerged."). 
45 See MARY DOUGLAS. RISK AND BLA�"Iv!E: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 
198 (1992) (stating that inst{tutional economics "characterizes individuals in the 
marketplace as weakly rational and weakly moral"). 
46 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 3 1-32 (1975) (stating that obtaining informa­
tion is one of the most important transaction costs). Carl Dahlman identifies 
the time, effort and expense of obtaining the "information necessary to make an 
exchan&e, negotiate the exchange and enforce the exchange" as trar;sact�on 
costs. �ee Cart Dahlman, The Problems of Extetrt.ahty, 22 J. L. & ECON. 1 4 1, 149 
(197� . 
4 Anthony Obershall & Eric M. Leifer, Efficiency and Social Institutions: 
Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology, 12 ANN. REV. Soc. 233, 
237 4\190861�· 
rc W"ll" C . F . r . . �'I A r • 1ver x:. 1 1amson, omparatlve �conomrc ;Jrganzzatwn: j r;e natyszs 
of DiscreteStructuralAltematives, 36ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269,277 (1991). 
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Thus, an understanding of the relationship between transac­
tion costs and institutions is thought to be critical -co an under­
standing of economic exchange, the existence of institut ions, and 
the existence of international institutions. +9 lV1oreover j institu­
tional economics predicts that individuals will seek out and utilize 
institutions that minimize transaction costs, and may endeavor to  
create alternative institutions if suitable institutions do not  exist.50 
Institutional economics has been criticized in a number of 
ways? One criticism deals with the assumption that rat ional be­
havior is self-centered. In his writing, Amartya Sen has n oted that 
"[t]he economic man is a social moron."52 Other social scientists 
also criticize institutional economics' humans as "under social­
ized" and point out that economic relations are shaped by a multi­
tude of cultural interests that have nothing to do with self­
interest .53 Indeed, some institutional economists  feel that their 
49 See THRAIN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS: 
PRlNCil'ALS OF NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1990) ;  NEIL KOMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) ; Bruno Frey, The Economic Approach to Institutions: 
fnsritutions Matter: The Comparative Analysis of Institutions, 34 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 443 (1990) ;  Werner Pommerehne, The Empirical Relevance of Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 458 (1990) ;  Beth V. Yarbrough & 
Robert M. Yarbrough, International Organizations and the New Economics of 
Organizations, 44 INT'L ORG. 235 ( 1990) (book review) . 
50 See Douglass C.  North, lnstitutional Change: A Framework of A nalysis, in 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 35, 35-46 
(Sven-Erik Sjostrand ed. , 1 993) (discussing theory of institutional change) ;  An­
drew Stone et al . ,  Public Institutions and Private Transactions: A Comparative 
A nalysis of the Legal and Regulatory Environment for Business Transactions in 
Brazil and Chile, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 95, 98-
100 (Lee Alston et a!. eds.,  1 996) (discussing and applying theory of institutional 
chanpe) . 
5 An emotional response to the general criticism is found in WILLIAM M. 
DUGGER, UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS: A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONALIST 
DISSENT xviii (1992) ("So our realism will continue to be a threat to academic 
complacency as long as the real world exists, for the real world is insistent and 
can push its surprises into the most cloistered of academic sanctuaries.") . The 
responses of Ronald Coase (1991 ) ,  Gary Becker (1992) and Douglass C. North 
(1993) to general critics of institutional economics were less emotional but 
pr?bably more effective: each of these institutional economists won the Nobel 
pnze. 
52 Ama�ya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations 
ofEconomzc Fheorj, 6 PI-T..IL. & PUB. AFF. 336, 336 (1977) . 
53 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of 
Ernbededness, 9 1  AM. J. Soc. 4 8 1 ,  502-05 (1985) .  
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discipline can only overcome these barriers by borrowing from 
othe� social sciences . 54 
Despite these criticisms, many social sciences have found the 
transaction cost analysis contained in institutional economics to 
be valuable. The law and economics movement has an obvious 
interest in this school of thought. 55  Indeed, Ronald Coase' s trans­
action cost explanation for the existence of firms has become the 
dominant paradigm in corporate legal theory. 56 
54 See Bates, supra note 4 1 ,  at 54-59 (calling for a "new anthropology") ; see 
also Christian Knudsen, Equilibrium, Perfect Rationality and the Problem of Self 
Reference in Economics, in RATIONALITY, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
METHODOLOGY 133 ,  1 34 (Uskali Maki et al . eds . ,  1993) (arguing that solving 
basic problems in institutional economics "seems to require a broadening of the 
behavioural foundation of economics insofar as one has to emphasize not only 
the substantive, but also the procedural and the epistemic aspects of rational­
ity") . But see Thrain Eggerston, A Note on the Economics of Institutions, in 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 50, at 6, 1 7-20 
(defending the assumption of self-interested, rational behavior) .  
55 See generally Steven G .  Medema, Discourse and the Institutional Approach 
to Law and Economics: Factors that Separate the Institutional Approach to Law 
and Economics from Alternative Approaches, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 4 17  ( 1989) ;  
Richard Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 
J .  INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73 ( 1993) . 
56 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management within a Theory of 
the Firm, 21 J .  CORP. L. 657, 659 (1996) (stating that economic theories are 
"now the dominant paradigm in corporate law") ; Ronald H. Coase, The Nature 
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386  ( 1937) ,  reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 ( 1988); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond 
Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation {or the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 
5 1 3 ,  5 1 5  ( 1993) (stating that offspring of Coase's analysis "still reigns supreme in 
the academic literature") ; Jason S. Johnston, The Influence of the Nature of the 
Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 1 8  J .  CORP. L. 213 ,  2 1 3  (1993) (stating that 
Coase's theory dominates theoretical work in corporate law) . Oliver WiTliam­
son has expanded Coase's original theory in a manner that has particular appli­
cation to mstitutional economics. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION: FIR.M:S, MARKETS AND POLICY CONTROL (1986) ; Oliver E. 
Williamson, Economics and Organizations: A Primer, 38 CAL MGMT. REV. 13 1 
( 1996) .  
It should be noted that the dominance o f  Coase's theory o f  firms does not 
mean that there is only one economic model of firms. Michael Jensen and Wil­
liam Meckling, for example, define a firm not in terms of agency costs but in­
stead as a "nexus for contracting relationships ." Michael C. Jensen & 'Yiilliam 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and OwneY­
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 3 1 1  (1976) .  But see William W. Bratton, Jr. ,  
The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 
407, 4 15 (1989) (criticizing Jensen and Meckling's and related theories) . Oliver 
Hart, on the other hand, emphasizes not contracts but instead the ownership of 
property by the firm . See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FI­
NANCIAL STRUCTURE 57 (1995) . Other economists proffer an employment 
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Joel T rachtman has used institutional economics as the foun­
dation for comparison of international economic o rganizations, 
including the World Trade Organization.  Trachtman hypot he­
sizes that "states use and desi gn international i nstitutions to 
maximize the members' net gains , '' which are the gains from ,a 
transaction minus the losses from and costs of that transaction.  )7 
Trachtman makes the important distinction between the markets 
to which institutional ec;nomics is usually applied58 and the in­
ternational arena: the commodities exchanged in the interna-. 1 " d '  1 1 1  . f "59 twna arena are agreements regar mg tne a ocatwn o power.  
After thoroughly working through the details of institutional 
economic theory and applying them to international economic 
organizations, T rachtman concludes that, although additional 
theoretical and empirical work needs to be done, institutional 
economics provides a useful means of scrutinizing and comparing 
international economic organizations . The metric for scruti ny 
and comparison, in Trachtman's  theory, is how efficient an inter­
national economic organization is in maximizing states' prefer­
ences. 60 T rachtman 's excellent analysis i llustrates the potential of 
an institutional economic analysis of the \Xl orld Trade Organiza­
tiOn. 
In short ,  inst itutional economics uses institutions to  explain 
the act ions of rational, self-interested actors .  These actors create 
or modify institutions on the basis of the extent to which the in­
stitutions enhance efficiency in obtaining the actors' preferences. 
Institutional economics has influenced legal scholarship, and wil l  
probably make inroads in internat ional law scholarship. Indeed, 
it has been used as an analytic for t he comparison of international 
economic organizations such as the World Trade O rganization. 
theorv of the firm.  See, e.g. , Samuel B owles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Ex· 
chang�: New Microfoundations for the Politica{ Economy of.Capitalism, 1 8  PoL. & 
Soc. 165 (1 990) ; Bengt Holstrom & Paul M1lgrom, The Fznn as an Incentzve Sys­
tem ,  84 AM . ECON. REV. 972 (1 994) ; Louis Putterman, Ownership and the Na­ture .?jthe Firrn., 1 7  J. COMP. ECON. 243 ( 1993) . 
' Joel P .  Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Interna­
tionaL Economic Organization: Toward Comparati1..o·e Institutionaf A nalysis, 1 7  
Nw. J .  Irn'L L. e{. Bus. 470, 473-74 (1 997) .  The statement obviously resonates 
with aspects of regime theory i n  that i nstitutions are designed by their users 
and serve rational , means-end utilities. 
58  That is ,  the market for goods or services . 
59 Trachtman, suora note 57, ac 487.  Trachtman notes that in l egal analvsis 
power is  called j urisd�ct ion. See id. at 498 .  ) 
be See id. at 555 .  
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To label historical institutionalism and sociological institu­
t ionalism as "alternative" forms of institutionalism may be some­
what misleading. Both are firmly established schools of thought 
in other disciplines: historical institutionalism has been a part of 
political science since the 1960s and sociological institutionalism 
has been a growing part of sociology for almost as long.6 1  The 
term "alternative" is used in this Article only to emphasize that 
these schools of thought have not yet been mined by international 
legal scholarship . 
Because some legal scholars may be unfamiliar with either his­
torical or sociological institutionalism, each is briefly discussed in 
the following subsections. 
2. 1. Historical Institutionalism and Sociological 
Institutionalism 
2. 1.1. Historical Institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism 62 is a reaction to and extension of 
the group theory and structural functionalist approaches to po­
litical science that dominated the 1 960s and 1970s. Group theory 
emphasizes power and conflict, arguing that politics is a balancing 
"of various forces contending for power and the making of deci­
sions . "
63 Structural functionalism compares social entities to or-
61  An especially informative discussion of historical and sociological insti­
tutionalism from which this Article benefits substantially is Peter A. Hall & 
Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutional isms, 49 
POL STUD. 936 (1996) . 
62 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo use the appellation "historical insti­
tutionalism." See Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism 
in Comparative Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTI­
TUTIONALISM IN COMPARi\TIVE ANALYSIS 1 ,  2 (Kathleen Thelen & Sven Ste­
inmo eds . ,  1992) .  They, in turn, attribute the phrase to Theda Skopcol. See id. 
at 28  n .4 .  It is not always identified as such by members of the school .  
6 3  RONALD H. CHILCOTE, THEORlES OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE 
SEARCH FOR A PARADIGM 35 (198 1) . Obviously, group theory cannot be 
summarized in one sentence. A chapter length explanation of group theory can 
be found in JAMES A. BILL & ROBERT L HARDGRAVE, JR. ,  COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS: THE QUEST FOR THEORY 1 17- 141  (1973) . In particular, "[g]roup 
scholars view the political system as a gigantic network of groups in a constant 
state of interaction with one another. This interaction takes the form of pres­
sures and counterpressures, the outcome of which defines the state of the politi-
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ganic entities,64 and by studying how structures work together,  
tries "to provide a consistent and integrated theory from which 
can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects" of a 
given system.65 From group theory, historical institutionalism 
cal system at any given time."  !d. at 120. Moreover, "[i]n an attempt to un­
cover the 'real' or 'basic' forces of political l ife, group scholars ruthlessly cut 
through the formal and institutional trappings of government and focus[] their 
attent10n uron structures of competition." !d. at 134 .  Bil l  and Hardgrave at­
tribute the mtroduction of concepts such as "power," " interest," and "conflict" 
into mainstream political science to group theorists. Jd. at 1 34-35;  see John G.  
Gunnell, The Genealogy of A merican Pluralism: From Madison to Behavioralism, 
13 lNT'L POL. SCI. REV. 253 (1997) (discussing the influence of group theory on 
political science) ; cf CHILCOTE, supra, at 350 (giving John Locke, Jeremy Ben­
tham, and James Madison credit for providing the Intellectual basis for group 
theory) . Group theory continues to dominate American political science. See 
Paul H.  Brietzke, Administrative Law and Development: The A merican "Model" 
Evaluated, 26 How. L. J. 645, 659 (1983) ; see, e.g. , Marie Hojnacki, Interest 
Groups ' Decisions to Join A lliances or Work A lone, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 6 1  (1997) 
(usin_p group theory concepts). 
6 Cf A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUC11JRE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM­
ITIVE SOCIETY 178 (1952) (stating that the understanding of social function is 
based on "an analogy between social life and organic life"). 
65 William Flanigan & Edwin Fogelman, Functional A nalysis, in 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS 72, 76 (Tames C. Charlesworth ed. ,  
1967) . Again, this school of  thought cannot be fufly explicated in one sentence. 
For a longer treatment, see BILL & HARDGRAVE, supra note 63 , at 201-17; see 
also CHILCOTE, supra note 63 , at 162-82 (analyzing the work of Gabriel Al­
mond, an important early figure in structural functionalism) . In particular, 
structural functionalists perce1ve society as "a tightly integrated system of inter­
related elements or structures. These structures exist because they perform 
functions: one can explain various structures . . . by discoverir:_g their func­tion." David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Lije of the Law 
and Society Movement, 1 8  FLA. ST. U.  L. REV. 4, 32 (1990) .  Analytically, "[t]he 
principal objective of functional analysis is to determine the contribution 
which a social item (a structure or process) makes to the persistence of the sys­
tem in which it occurs, that is, the role it plays in maintaining the system 
within specified limits . "  BILL & HARDGRAVE, supra note 63, at 203 . The most 
glaring weakness of structural functionalism is its requirement that all systems 
perform functions: in reality there are many dysfunctional systems. See John 
H. Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question ,  41 STAN. L .  REV. 435, 445 
(1989) (book review) (attributing the demise of structural functionalism to the 
discovery of dysfunctional systems) . Given these and other explanatory weak­
nesses, the predominance of structural functionalism has waned. SeeNICHOLAS 
C. MULLINS, THEORIES AND THEORY GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 66-67 (1973) (stating that structural functionalism 
stopped being the majority view in 1968) .  Nonetheless, structural functional­
ism continues to exert influence on political science. See Ruth Lane, Structural­
Functionalism Reconsidered: A Proposed Research Model, 26 COMP. POL. 461 
(1 994) (advocating use of the structural functionalist model for theoretical re­
search) ; Susan A. Mann et al . ,  Paradigm Shifts in Family Sociology? Evidence 
from Three Decades of Family Textbooks, 18 J. FAM. ISSUES 3 1  (1997) (arguing 
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draws the concept of rivalry; from structural functionalism,  his­
torical institutionalism draws an image of the polity as an inte­
grated system. The primary difference between historical institu­
tionalism and its intellectual forebears is that while structural 
functionalists often argued that external factors drive the func­
tioning of a system, historical institutionalists hold that the sys­
tem stnlctures collective behavior and t hus shapes external 
66 events. 
Historical institutional ists perceive institutions as the formal 
or informal rules or procedures embedded in a formal organiza­
tion. Peter Hall defines institutions as 
the formal nlles, compliance procedures , and standard op­
erating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy. As 
such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms 
but one that does not necessarily derive from legal , as op­
posed to conventional, standing. . . . [T]he term " organ­
ization" will be used here as a virtual synonym for 
"
. . . ,67 mstttutwn. 
Because historical institutionalism has not yet coalesced as a 
doctrinal school, it is difficult to summarize in a few short para­
graphs; nonetheless, some of the basic characteristics of historical 
institutionalism can be highlighted. The most striking, and per­
haps definitive, characteristic of this school of thought is its em­
phasis on the historical "path" taken by an institution in  its crea­
tion and development. 68 These pathways are marked by critical 
that structural functionalism is so deeply embedded in political science dis­
course that it continues to govern significant issues and debates). 
66 Hall & Taylor, supra note 61 ,  at 937. 
6 7  PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE 
INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 19  (1986) .  
68 See Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Sys­
tems, and Voter A lignments: A n  Introduction, in PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER 
ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1 ,  37 (Seymour M. Lipset & 
Stein Rokkan eds. ,  1967) . Paul David refers to this as"path dependent" change. 
Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
P.APERS & PROC. 332, 332 (1985) .  Path dependency, of course, has become an 
analytical tool used by other social sciences, albeit in slightly different forms. 
Path dependency has even been used in purely legal analysis. See Maxwell L. 
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144- U. PA. L. REV. 309 
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junctures, or cleavages, which present new paths or opportunities 
for change . "A critical juncture may be defined as a period of sig­
nificant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in differ­
ent countries and which is hypothesized to produce distinct lega­
cies . "69 A critical juncture is measured against a baseline of 
antecedent conditions . Ruth Collier and David Collier explain 
that there are three claims made of a purported critical juncture : 
that significant change took place, that the change took place i n  a 
distinct way, and that the change produced a legacy.70 The legacy 
is critical to historical institutionalism because it becomes the new 
antecedent condition, conditions what choices can be made at fu­
ture critical junctures , and determines the range of choices that 
can be made on a day to day basis .7 1  Stephen Krasner makes ex­
plicit this core assumption of historical institutional ists : 
Historical developments are path dependent; once certain 
choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. The 
range of options available to policymakers at any given 
point in time is a function of institutional capabi l ities that 
were put in place at some earlier period, possib ly in re-
d.ff 
. 
l 7
? 
sponse to very t._ erent env1ronmenta pressures. -
Historical institutionalists emphasize the role of power, com­
petition, and coalitions in analyzing how an institution operates. 
This, of course, is a legacy of historical institutionalism's group 
theory roots . lY1argaret Weir's discussion of U.S .  economic policy 
(1995) (using path dependency to analyze standing) ; Ma..xweli L Stearns , Stand· 
ing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 309 
(1995) (using path dependency to analyze justiciability) . 
69 RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLI"DCAL 
ARENA: CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME 
DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 29 (199 1 )  (footnote omitted) . 
70 See id. at 30. Collier and Collier also break the legacy down into three 
components: "mechanisms of production of the legacy," "[m ]echanisms of repro­
duction of the legacy," and "stability of the core attributes of the legacy. "  !d. at 30-
3 1 .  Each of these attributes bears directll on whether the purported legacy is in 
fact a legacy, that is ,  whether the critica juncture effectuated a real and lasting 
chanpe in extant conditions . See id. 7 Cf JAMES GLICK, CHAOS 8 (1987) (emphasizing the "sensitive depend­
ence on initial conditions") . 
7? � h D T s . A I . . I c . - ;)tep.1en . 1\..rasner, overezgnty: n nstztutzona. 1Jerspectzve, 2 1  COMP. 
POL. STuD. 66, 67 (1988) .  
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is a striking example of this preoccupation. She demonstrates that 
the structure of the political system leads to certain types of coali-
• 1 ... . 73 .l. 'tlons and precludes others. 
Historical inst itutional ism exhibits a nonparochial approach 
w the causal forces in politics. Although the role of institutions is 
emphasized and thoro-ughly explored) -it is not given an exclusive 
role .  "They typically seek to locate institut ions in a causal chain 
that accommodates a role for other factors ,  notably socioeco­
nomic development and the diffusion of ideas. In this respect, 
they posit a world that is more complex than the world of tast�s 
and institutions often postulated by" self-interest based theories.14 
An example t hat is of particular pertinence to this A rticle is an 
analysis by Judith Goldstein)  in ·which she demonstrates that the 
structure for formulating trade policy in  the United States rein­
forces the influence of certain types of ideas and diminishes the 
influence of others; the ideas themselves are significant factors in 
d . h 75 pro ucmg t e outcome. 
Similarly, historical i nstitutionalism does not posit one exclu­
sive means by which institutions affect individual behavior.76 
I-Iall and Taylor set out two competing theories of how institu­
tions affect behavior: the calculus approach and the cultural ap­
proach.77 The calculus approach assumes that behavior is strate­
gic. According to the calculus approach, institutions "provide 
information relevant to the behavior of others, enforcement 
mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection, and the 
73 See Margaret Weir, Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation ,  in 
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS, supra note 62, at 1 88 ;  see also SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND 
DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO Fr. 
N.A..NCING THE MODERN STATE (1993) (explaining cross-country differences in 
tax systems by examining the way that political structure affects access to-and 
therefore power over-the political decisionmaking system) . 
-4 ' Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 ,  at 942. 
75 See Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions and A merican Trade Policy, 42 
INT'L 0RG . (1988) .  
7 6  Hall a
,
nd Taylor state: "Central t o  any institutional analysis is the ques­
tiOn: how do institutions affect the behaviour of individuals? After all, it is 
through the action of individuals that inst itutions have an effect on political 
questions ."  Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 ,  at 939.  It should be  recalled t hat 
both Burley and Shell criticize regime theor·y for its inabiEty to explain how 
institutions relate to individuals .  See supra notes 26 & 33 and accompanying 
text . 
77 See Hall & Taylor, s.wpn! note 6 l ;  at 939 .  
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l . k 78 . . 1 ,.. 1 1  • d . . d 1 1 ., _L e . "  Instltutwns, tneretore, allow 1n._ 1v1 ua s to :-_::;Lculate ra-. 1 ' . . . h ful . d .  . . 1 79 tlona 1y and pers1st because t __ ey are use to m .1v1dua ... actors. 
L • ] • . 1 b 1 . . fu' T ne cultura. approach recogmzes tnat enavwr 1s purpose 1 ,  
but emphasizes the fact -chat i t  i s  bounded by established routines, 
existing patterns , and worldviews . 80 According to the cultural 
approach, inst itutions "provide moral or cognitive templates for 
interpretation and act ion . "8 1 Institutions thus allow an individual 
to filter and make meaningful the morass of information not only 
concerning the situation, but also concerning the individual him-
lf h 1 f 82 -, . . . b . d 1 . se or .erse1 . 1nst1tut10ns persist ecause they are eepq m-
grained and because they shape the choices that an individual 
k b - . . . . 83 rna es a out retormmg mstltutwns. 
78 Id. 
79 See Randall L. Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Socia! Institutions, 
in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 2 16, 2 1 6  (Teffrey S .  Banks & Eric A. Ha­
nushek eds . ,  1 995) ;  see also Kenneth A. Shepsfe, Institutional Equililrrium and 
Equilibrium Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 5 1 ,  
74-75 (Herbert F .  Weisberg ed. , 1986) (arguing that individuals are hesitant to 
alter institutions even for short term gam because change creates a great deal of  
future uncertainty) . This analysis i s  similar to that of the institutiOnal econo­
mist Douglass C .  North. See North, supra note 8 ,  at 1 89 .  
80 See, e.g. , John L. Campbell ,  The State and Fiscal Sociology, 19 ANN . REV. 
Soc. 163,  1 64 (1 993) (acknowledging that rational incentives are important but 
stating that cultural restraints are equally important) . 
8 1  Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 ,  at 939.  
8 2  See James G.  March & Johan P .  Olsen, The New Institutionalism: O-rgan­
izational Factors in Political Life, 78  AM . PoL SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984) .  A 
study conducted in Hungary provides interesting, and unintentional, empirical 
veritication of this construct. The study found that a change in institutions, 
specifically, the advent of advertising, changed the manner in which individual 
Hungarians exp�essed their cultural identitJ. See Beverly James, L-?aming to Consume: A n  Ethnographzc Study of Cultura Change zn Hungary, 12 CRITICAL 
STUD. M.A.SS COMM. 287 (1995) .  
8 3  See ROBERT GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM:  SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RATIONAL ACTORS (1992) . Interestingly, some legal scholars have made the same observation about the relationship between 
law and society: that law is defined by, but at the same time defines, society. 
Mary Ann Glendon, in particular, has explored this aspect of  law. See f.IIA.R.Y 
ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 3 1 1  (1989) ("A 
country's law . . . both affects and is affected by the culture in which it 
arises . . . .  ") ; see also Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: De­
constructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in 
Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB . L. REV. 1087,  1087 (1995) ("Law shapes and 
defines who we are as a culture while reinforcing the belief system that under­
girds it . ") ;  Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 56, 83 (1993) ("The law is a powerful conceptual-rhetorical, discursive­
force. It expresses conventional understandin�s of value, and at the same time 
influences conven�ional understandings of value . ") ;  Lawrence Rosen, A Con-
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Regime theory and institutional economics both clearly postu­
late a calculus approach to explore the relationship between indi­
viduals and inst itutions . Historical institutionalists, on the other 
h d h d 1 h r 1 h 84 ·k· 1 · 1 an , ave use . oot or tnese approac .es . A stn mg examp e 1s 
Victoria Hattam's analysis of labor movements. In discussing the 
U.S . labor movement, she speaks of the movement analyzing and 
adopting or avoiding certain strategies--i n  particular, moving 
away from strategie,s that were susceptible to review by the en­
trenched judiciary. 8) On the other hand, when comparing the 
U.S .  labor movement to the British labor movement, she con­
trasts the different institutions available to each movement , and 
discusses how these institutions created different worldviews that 
led to different actions.  86 
Historical institutionalisrn qua historical institutionalism 87 has 
made virtually no inroads into legal scholarship.  Ronald Kahn, 
who is educated as a political scientist rather than as a lawyer, re­
cently published an article on presidential appointment power 
that explicitly suggests historical institutionalism as a valuable 
model for legal scholarship. 88 Kahn particularly emphasizes his­
torical institutionalism's ability to describe and i nterpret the roles 
f fl . 1 • • 89 Tl" h ' • · · h o power, con .lCt, ana cooperatiOn. x\..a n s admomt10n, ow-
ever, has not been heeded by legal scholarship . In fact, Kahn 
chided his fellow panelists in the symposium from which his arti­
cle was published for not taking advantage of historical institu-
. l .  90 twna 1sm. 
sumer's Gt-tide to Law and the Social Sciences, 100 YALE L.J .  53 1 ,  542 (1990) 
(book review) ("[L]aw is preeminently an artifact of culture: it is influenced by 
and constitutive of the way in which the members of a society comprehend 
their actions towards one another and infuse those actions with an air of im­
manent and superordinate worth.") .  
8 4  See Hall & Taylor, supra no�e 6 1 ,  at 940. 
85 See VICTORIA C. HATTAlv1 , LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE 
ORIGINS OF BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) . 
86 See id. at 1 80-203 . 
87 That is, h istorical institutionalism as a school of thought rath:.;r than the 
simple concept of path dependency. 
"Kg See Ronald C. Kahn, Presidential Power and the Appointments Process: 
Structuralism, Legal Scholarship, and the New Historical Institutionalism, 47 CASE 
W. RES.  L. REV. 1419,  1 449-50 (1997) .  
89 See id. at 1446. Kahn relies heavily o n  Stephen Skowronek, Order and 
Change, 28 POLITY 9 1  (1995) .  
90 See Kahn, supra note 8 8 ,  at 14�·5 .  
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I h � · · 1 · · · ·1 · · . ,  1 1 r n s. o rt ,  rustonca InstttutJOIH11srn 1s a v1 brant scnooi or 
thought within the realm of political science . The definitive char­
acteristic of historical institutionalism-an attenuated path de-
cl ' b ct' 
. ' . 't . . 1 , . , 'l 
pen .ency-has , een use,.. m otner soe1a. soences, mcmmng lega 
scholarship . Historical institutionalism as a whole, however,  has 
not been -imported into legal scholarship or international la·w 
• • • • • 1 r · 1 • · • ' schola rsh1p m tne manner or regime tneory or mst1tutwnal eco-
nomics .  In particular, no legal scholar has used historical i nstitu­
tionalism as a model for critically analyzing the World Trade Or­
gamzatwn.  
2. 1 . 2. Sociological Institutionalism 
Just as in international relations theory, economics, political 
science, and so many other of the social sciences, a n ew institu­
tional school has appeared in sociology.  Hall and Taylor label 
h. h 1 - ,  • 1 . 1 . • • 1 · "91 Th h 1 f . t !S SCr 00  ' SOClO ogiCal 1TIStltUt10na lSffi. e SC _00 0 .  SOClO-
logical institutionalism first appeared within the subspecialty of 
. . ' 92 Th . r h . f L • h 1 orgamzatwn theory. 1 e tmpetus tor t e creation o� tms sc �oo 
was discomfort with a distinction-drawn since the time of }Jax 
Weber-between rational, formal, modern organizations (such as 
bureaucracy) and the parts of social life associated with c�lture. 93 
Some sociologists found this distinction to be artificial , and ar­
gued against the notion that a certain class of institutions are cho­
sen or created simply because they are the most effective at ac­
complishing a desired end. Rather, they argtted, institutions are 
chosen,  created and transmitted in the same manner as any other 
cultural artifact, such as ritual or myth. 94 Thus, the underlying 
91 Sociologists themselves seem to refer to this school of thought simply as " institutional ism."  See, e.g. , Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell ,  lntroduc· 
tion, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 ,  1 
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eels . ,  199 1) .  This is similar to legal 
scholars who refer to their theory simply as institutionalism.  
9 2  This resulted in important works such as THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9 1 ,  and JOHN \Y/ . . MEYER & W. 
RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RI11JAL AND 
RATIONALITY (1983) ;  INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
(W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer eds . ,  1994) . 
93 Th' d' . . . 1 • h . d . F , P. D 1 L . c 
. 
l ts tstmcttOn 1s arawn and emp1 as1ze m rank .:.-.. . o o um , u!tura 
iv!odels of Organization: The Social Construction of Rational Organ izing Princi­
ples, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 1 17 (Diana Crane ed, , 1994) . 
94 See John W. Meter & Brian Rowan, institutionalized o�ganiu.tions: 
Formal Structure as Mytn and Ceremony, 83 Ar·<'L .J . Soc. 34·0 (1977) ;  see also 
MEYER &: SCOTT, sufFa note 92. Niel Fligstein particularly argues that markers 
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question for sociological institutionalists asks not what utilities 
l . . . 1 ' b . d h 1 ' (  causea an 1 nst1tut 1 0 n  to be createa. ut mstea w at cu tural rac-
1 1 . . 95 - d d - - - ' l  '�1 · . d R 1 � tors ec. to 1ts creatiOn. ln ee , N e1 .l' �lgstem an o oe rt t ree-
land argue that theories that take into account political, institu­
tional and cultural factors as causal �lements explain empirical 
data better than do economic theories . 90 
Sociological institutionalists may have the broadest definition 
of institutions of any of the social sciences. Institutions, co a so­
ciological institutional ist , include not only formal and informal 
rules and procedures, but also symbols, cognitions, norms, and 
any other ,templates that organize or give meaning to the human 
condition. 77 This definition expl icitly blurs the distinction be­
tween culture and institutions; in fact , under such a definition, 
culture itself may be an institution. 98 The definition .is broad, 
however, only in terms of what types of structures it will include; 
it is quite rigorous in terms of what qualities are required of these 
structures . A rule or pattern is only considered an institution by 
sociological institutionalists if there is an unspoken sense that the 
rule or pattern must be fol lowed or adhered to.99 In this sense, 
and culture are inseparable. See Niel Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political, 
Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 6 1  AM. Soc. REV. 656 (1996) .  
95 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 ,  at 947. Thus, John Campbell differen­
tiates sociological institutionalism from other approaches by focusing explicitly 
on "the complex social interactions and institutional and historical contexts 
that l ink state and society in ways that shape fiscal policy and their effects . "  
Campbell, supra note 80, at 1 64 ; see also Paul J .  DiMaggio & Helmut K .  Anheir, 
The Sociology of Nonprofit Organizations and Sectors, 1 6  ANN. REV. Soc. 137 
(1990) (statmg that the emergence of nonprofit organizations is caused by insti­
tutional factors as well as the individual utility functions emphasized by 
economists, and that to understand nonprofit organizations one must use an 
industry level ecological perspective) . 
96 See Neil Fligstein & Robert Freeland, Theoretical and Comparative Per­
spectives on Corporate Organization, 2 1  ANN. REV. Soc. 2 1 ,  40 (1995) .  
97 See W .  Richard Scott, Institutions and Organization: Toward a Theoretical 
Synthesis, in lNSTinJTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND 0RGANIZA TIONS, supra 
note 92, at 55, 56. 
98 See Ronald L. J epperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institution­
alism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 0RGANIZA TIONAL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 9 1 ,  at 86, 143,  150-5 1 ;  John Meyer et al . ,  Ontology and Rationalization in 
the Western Cultural A ccount, in INSTITIJTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND THE 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 92 at 9; Lynne Zucker, The Role of Institutionaliza­
tion in Cultural Persistence, in THE NEW INSTlnJTIONALISM IN 0RGAN­
IZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9 1 ,  at 83 .  
9 9  See Jepperson, supra note 98 ,  at 143 ,  145 (noting that "institutions repre­
sent � �ocial order or patte�n that has attained a certam state or property" and provdmg an explanatiOn ot that state or property) ; Lynne G. Zucker, Orgam-
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Paul DiMaggio and \X/ alter Powell argue that the definition used 
by sociological institutionalists is actually more restrictive than 
that used by institutional economists, who consider mere rules of . b . 
. . 100 convemence to e mst1tutwns. 
Sociological institutionalism is no more unified than historical 
institutionalism. 10 1  Nonetheless, broad themes can be discerned. 
Sociological institutionalism emphatically embraces a cultural ap­
proach to the relationship between institutions and individual be­
havior. 102 Sociological i�stitutionalism "emphasize[s] the way in 
which institutions influence behavior  by providing the cognitive 
scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for action, 
not least because without them the world and the behaviour of 
others cannot be interpreted. " 103 Institutions and individual be-
zations as Institutions, in RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
1 ,  2 (S .B.  Bacharach ed. ,  1983) (stating that " institutionalism is fundamentally a 
cogmtive process") . Public international lawyers will note the similarity to cus­
tom, which is considered a source of international law that is binding, in part, 
because there is a sense that it is binding. See Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, June 26, 1945, art . 38 ,  59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1 153 ,  1 1 87 
(stating that to constitute custom, a country's behavior must not only consist of  
a general practice but must also be accepted by that country as obligatory) ; see 
also IAN BRO\'ifNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 
1990) (discussing custom) . 
100 See D iMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 ,  at 9; see also MARY DOUGLAS, 
How INSTITUTIONS THINK 46-48 (1986) .  Whether one definition actually is 
more restrictive than another is not a question with an objective answer, and 
has much to do with the underlying perspective of each school of thought . The 
instrumentalist orientation of institutional economics requires a definition that 
includes rules of convenience, whereas the cultural orientation of sociological 
institutionalists requires a definition that includes constructs that often are not 
scrutinized by other schools. 
101 DL.Maggio and Powell begin their introduction to sociological institu­
tionalism by noting that "it is often easier to gain agreement about what it is 
not than about what it is. "  DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 ,  at 1 .  
102 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the cultural ap­
proach) . 
103 Hall & Taylor, supra note 61 ,  at 948; see also DiMaggio & Powell ,  supra 
note 9 1 ,  at 3 ("[T]hougl:it of self, social action, the state, and citizenship are 
shaped by institutional forces. nl. Hall and Taylor note that "[i]nstitutions in­
fluence behaviour not simply oy specifying what one should do but also by 
specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a specific context . "  Hall & 
Taylor, supra note 61 ,  at 948; see also Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and Institutional 
Theory, 40 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 397, 397 (1997) (noting that sociologi­
cal institutionalism "treats shared meanings as constraints on action that limit 
and determine what is meaningful behavior") ; Zucker, supra note 98 ,  at 2 
(noting that shared cognitions define "what has meaning and what actions are 
possible") . 
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havior, therefore, are mutually constitutive and mutually rem­
forcing. 104 rv1oreover, even though an individual may be acting 
rationally or out of self interest, perceptions of rationality or s�lf 
interest are framed through-and thus shaped by-institutions. 1 0=> 
Sociological institutionalism also propounds a cultural account 
for the origination and alteration of institutions . This is most eas­
ily understood when contrasted with institutional economics. In­
stitutional economics places the creation or alteration of institu­
tions in the hands of entrepreneurs who act when the benefits of 
creation or alteration will outweigh the costs. 1 06 In other words, 
institutional economics proffers a voluntaristic, means-end ori­
ented explanation. Sociological institutionalism, on the other 
hand, does not proffer a utilitarian explanation; instead, it  argues 
that institutions are created or changed because the new institu­
tion will confer greater social legitimacy on the organization or its 
individuals . "In other words, organizations embrace specific insti­
tutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued 
within a broader cultural environment. " 107 Legitimate institu­
tions should not be confused with laudable institutions, the adjec­
tive that is more accurate is "plausible" 1 08 -institutions are ac-
d 'f 1 'd  d " . " 109 0 d cepte 1 tney are cons1 ere appropnate. nee create or 
104 See supra note 83 (discussing the mutually reinforcing roles of actions 
and institutions and similarities with law) ; see also Jepperson, supra note 98, at 
146 �"institutions simultaneously empower and control") . 
1 5 See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 ,  at 1 0  ("[T]he very notion of ra­
tional choice reflects modern secular rituals and myths that constitute and con­
strain legitimate actions .") ; see also Ann Swidler & J or?e Arditi, The New Sociol­
ogy of Knowledge, 20 ANN . REV. Soc. 305 ( 1994) ,arguing that patterns of 
knowledge in organizations shape both the content and structure of knowl­
edge) . Interestingly, the prominent regime theorist Robert Keohane agrees: 
"institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units con­
stituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that 
power. " Robert 0. K.eohane, International Institutions: Two Research Programs, 
32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379, 3 82 (1988) .  
106 See North, supra note 8, at 19 1-92. 
107 Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 ,  at 949. 
108 See ROBERT WUTHNOW ET AL.,  CULTURAL ANALYSIS 49-50 (1984) 
(stating that legitimation means "explaining or justifying the social order in 
such a way as to make institutional arrangements subjectively plausible") ; see 
also W. Richard Scott, Unpacking Institutional A rguments, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9 1 ,  at 1 64, 
1 69-70 (discussing legitimacy) . 
109 See March & Olsen , supra note 82,  at 7 4 1  (stating that "actors connote 
certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropnateness") . In Limits of 
Citizenship, Yasemin Soysal concludes that states adopted certam policies to-
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altered, institutions persist not because they are useful but instead 
because institutions constrain the manner in which individuals are 
1 1 ' d  h . . . . 1 10 aD e to cons1 er c _angmg mstltutwns. 
Sociological institutionalism has not been completely voiceless 
in mainstream legal scholarship . Edward Rubin, who advocates a 
" • · • 1 • , ·fy· h · r 1 1 1 1 · ne·�v mst1tut10nansm as a um mg t eoretlc or aw, mcorpo-
rates the work of James March and Johan Olsen as well as those 
of Paul DiJVIaggio and Walter Powell in his explanation of institu­
tionalism . 1 12 Rubin's is a very limited use of sociological institu­
tionalism-he suggests a microanalysis of courts as institutions. 1 13 
Nonetheless, his approach-in which he examines societal motiva­
tions of judges in an institutional context-resonates with the gen­
eral tenets of sociological institutionalism. 1 14 Rubin 's  use of so­
ciological institutionalism stands virtually alone in legal 
scholarship, and has not been replicated in international legal 
scholarship .  
In short, although sociological institutionalism is an emerging 
school of thought, its concept of how institutions inform individ­
ual behavior and how institutions are created and altered can be 
wards immigrants not because those policies were functional or beneficial to 
the state but instead because those policies conformed to evolving concepts of 
human rights. Y ASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP 1 64 
(1994) .
, 
The concep� of . appropriateness may be vaguely reflect�d in Richard Posner s concept or mtUitwn. For example, Posner has defended slavery con­
tracts as a matter of economic theory and of legal theory. See RICHARD A .  
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS O F  JUSTICE 86 ( 1981) (economic theory) ; Richard 
A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 ,  134 (1979) 0egal theory) . He does not countenance slavery contracts , however, 
because they fail "the ultimate test" of a moral theory, which he describes as 
conformity to intuition. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JU­
RISPRUDENCE 376-77 (1990) . Similarly, even if some utility argument in favor  
of  slavery could be fabricated, sociological institutionalism predicts that slavery 
would not be instituted because it is not considered appropriate and certainly 
does not enhance the legitimacy on an organization. 
1 10 See DiMaggio & Powell ,  supra note 9 1 ,  at 10- 1 1 ,  1 4- 1 5 .  With an inter­
esting turn of a phrase, DiMaggio and Powell state "[i]n other words, some of 
the most important sunk costs are cognitive ."  Id. a t  1 1 .  
1 1 1  See Rubin, supra note 1 .  
1 12 See Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as 
an Institution, 85 CAL. L.  REV . 265, 280 n .41  (1997) (reviewing C"-.SS R. StJNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT ( 1996) ) .  Rubin also 
refers to institutional economists such as Douglass North and Oliver William­
son. See id. 
1 1 3 See id. at 2 8 1 .  
l H  A particularly excellent example is Edward Rubin & Malcom Feeley, 
Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 989 (1996) .  
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• l 1 � h 1 � 'h 1 ., . 1 . . sketchea out . t·� o :neL1e ess , even Lwug tnese analyt1ca prn1Cl-
ples are available, they have barely entered the realm of legal 
h 1  1 '  , . ' . d '  . . 1 1  1 sc1 o-tarsmp ana. have not been nnporte mto mternatwna .tega scholarship . 1 i 5  In particular, sociological institutionalism has not 
been used as a model for analysis of the 'World Trade Organiza­
t i o n .  
2. 1.3. .Historical institutionalism and Sociological 
Institutionalism Differ 
Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
differ from one another. At the level of first principles, which is 
the level at vlhich this Article scrutinizes the various theoretical 
schools, they differ on at least two points:  the creation and altera­
tion of institutions, and the role of institutions in affecting indi­
vidual behavior. 
With respect to the creatio n  and alteration of institutions, the 
difference might be summarized as one of perspective; histori cal 
institutionalism looks inward while sociological institutionalism 
looks outward. In other words, historical institutionalism exam­
ines factors pertinent to the institution under scrutiny-its past 
and the decision constraints that flow from the past-when asking 
how an institution came into existence. Sociological institutional­
ists, on the other hand, examine factors that are exogenous to the 
institution under scrutiny--institutions already existing in  the 
cultural milieu act as the constraints on the creation and alteration 
of institutions. 
With respect to the role of institutions in affecting individual 
behavior, the difference is  one of scope.  Both historical and socio­
logical institutionalism accept the cultural approach to this rela­
tionship . Historical institutionalism, however, also accepts the 
1 1 5  It should be noted that the Yale School of international law did borrow 
conceots from the sociology of the time. The Yale School port rayed interna­
tional' law as process, and emphasized the interrelatedness of legal and other so­
cial processes . Unlike current sociological theory,  however, the Yale School 
displayed a distinctly realist posture . For example,  the test of international de­
ciswns was whether they conformed with cenam values critical to a world or­
der among nations. Similarly, the Yale School posits that enforcement of deci­
sions is sha?.?d by social , moral and pol itical relations among nations. See 
MYRES S .  MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P.  FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WOP.LD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
COERCION (1961) ;  Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing 
Order: How !ntemationaf Law is !Hade, 6 YALE ] .  WORLD PUB . ORDER 249 
(1980) .  
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calculus approach, thus evidencing a wider or perhaps more eclec­
tic perspective on the relationship between institutions and indi­
vidual behavior. An equally meaningfLd difference with respect 
to the role of institutions in affecting i ndividual behavior is in the 
quality of the treatment of the relationship between individual 
behavio r  and institutions. Taylor and Hall chide historical insti­
tutionalism for its lack of detailed attention to the relationship. 1 1 6 
A great amount of sociological institutionalism, in contrast, fo­
cuses on the relationship between institutions and individual be­
havior, particularly on the cognitive role of institutions; this at­
tention shapes a version of the cultur?.l approach that is both 
detailed and unique to sociological institutionalism. 
2. 2. A lternative Institutionalisms can be Distinguished from 
Other Institutionalisms 
Just as differences can be found between historical institution­
alism and sociological institutionalism, critical differences can be  
discerned between the "alternative" institutionalisms and the two 
types of institutionalism that have e ntered the mai nstream of in­
ternationai law scholarship. Again on the level of first principles, 
differences exist in the explanation each theoretical school  offers 
for the creation and alteration of i nstitutions, and for the role of 
institutions in affecting individual behavior. 
Perhaps the greatest contrast is with respect to the creation o r  
alteration o f  institutions. Regime theory and institutional eco­
nomics offer little theoretical substance on this subject . 1 17 Indi­
viduals or states choose an institution from a wide menu of possi­
bilities based on how well (or efficiently) that institution will 
effectuate the individuals' or states' p references . Neither regime 
theory nor institutional economics explain how the menu is cre­
ated, and the only constraint placed on the behavior of self­
interested actors is informational. In contrast , historical institu­
tionalism and sociological institutionalism, as discussed above, of-
1 1 6  See Hall & Taylor, sutJra note 61,  at 950. Their criticism is all the more 
credible given that Peter Hall is a leading h istorical institutionalist. 
1 17 Robert Keohane admits that regime theory, the school of which he is a 
prominent member, "leave[s] open the issue of what kinds of institutions will 
develop, to whose benefit, and how effective they will be ."  Keohane, supra 
note 105, at 3 8 8 .  
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fer elaborate exulanations of how that menu is  created, and sug-
lb [ . ' 1 } . i 1 8  gest a great n u m  er O f  constramts on actors o e  1av1 0 r .  
Regime theory and institutional economics do have elaborate 
explanations for the role institutions play in ordering b ehavior, 
although in the case of regime theory the analysis often deals with 
the behavior of states rather than individuals or voluntarv associa-
. 1 1 9  . . d 1 r h d ,  . twns . Instltutwns are use as too s to accomp, ls en s, and are 
used in a voluntary and rational manner.  Institutional economics 
in particular offers the most detailed explanation of individual be­
havior, although it is an explanation that rests uncomfortably on 
k 
. b d . d '  ' d  1 1 h . PO I star assumptwns a out state an m 1v1 ua oe avwr. - n con-
trast, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
offer a far less detailed explanation for individual behavior. In the 
case of historical institutionalism, the lack of detail may be attrib­
utable to a preoccupation with other aspects of institutionalism; 
nonetheless, historical institutionalism offers the insight that the 
calculus approach and the cultural approach may both be plausi­
ble in different times and situations. In the case of sociological in­
stitutionalism, the lack of detail is p robably attributable to the 
enormous task that the theory takes on, which is to fit behavior 
into the context of entire cult�res. 
Each of the four iterations of institutionalism discussed in this 
Article have analytical strengths and weaknesses, and each has as­
pects that the others could profitably borrow. The insights of re­
gime theory and institutional economics, as well as instances of 
their application to the World Trade Organization, are discussed 
above. What is equally interesting is that historical institutional-
1 1 8  In a similar vein, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that a dividing line 
among the various forms of institutionalism is whether a particular form of in­
stitutionalism's definition of institutions reflects the preferences of individuals 
or collective outcomes that are not the simple sum oi individual interests. See 
DiMaggio & Powell ,  supra note 9 1 ,  at 9. In this context it is interesting to con­
trast the common economic meaning of entrepreneur-to whom North attrib­
utes the changing of institutions, with the definition proffered by Fligstein-an 
actor with well developed social skills, particularly the ability w motivate co­
operation among other actors. See Fligstein, supra note 103 passim. 
1 19 But see supra note 36 (noting that a small number of regime theorists ar­
gue for the application of regime theory to non-state actors) . 
120 See Donohue & Ayres, supra note 40, at 8 1 2  (noting the limitations 
caused by the "clean assumr.tions" of law and economics) ; Thelen & Steinmo, 
supra note 62, at 12 (descnbing the "ruthless elegance" of economic explana­
tions) . 
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1 s m  and sociological insritutionalism also offer insights into the 
World Trade Organization . 
2.3. Historical Institutionalism and Sociological 
Institutionalism aYe lnstructi7Je to the Legal A nalvsis oF the - J 
World Trade Organization 
These differences between regime theory and institutional 
economics on the one hand) and historical institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism on the other, suggest that the alterna­
tive institutionalisms offer new perspectives to the legal scholar, 
and as a corollary offer trade scholars a means of sharpening their 
analysis of the Worid Trade Organization. Three short examples 
indicate that this is in fact the case. 
1 2 1  
The first example i s  t h e  dispute settlement process o f  the 
World Trade Organization. Several scholars have intuited that 
the dispute settlement process cannot be understood ·�;vithout un­
derstanding the process under the GATT. Their intuition is evi­
denced by the fact that prior to discussing dispute settlement 
within the World Trade Organization, these scholars often pro­
vide lengthy discussions of the process under the GATT_ i22 As a 
purely technical matter, such discussion is not required because 
the \'// orld Trade Organization is distinct from and is not the 
h . 1 I G �T PJ T . . 1 . d tee mea successor to tne · A  l . - _nsntutwna econom1es oes 
not require such a discussion, because institutions are created by 
rational actors free from the burden of prior institutions. Simi­
larly, regime theory has no place for such a discussion. In the ab-
121  These examples, of course, are not exhaustive. The question asked by 
this Article is not how alternative institutionalisms may be applied to analysis 
of the World Trade Organization ,  but instead why these iterations of institu­
tionalism have not to date been used in such analysis. 
122 See, e.g. , Ari� Reich, From pip!omacy :o L�w: The juridicization of !nter­
natwnal Trade Relatzons, 17 J. INT L L. & Bus. 77":> (1996-97) . 
123 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art . 2, cL 4, 
33 I.LM. :l 144, 1 145 (1994) [heremafter the "Charter"] ("The General Agree­
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in Annex 1 A  (hereinafter referred 
to as 'GATT 1994') is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, dated 30 October 1947 . . .  as subsequently rectified, amended or 
modified (hereinafter referred to as 'GATT 1947') .n) ; Amelia Porges , Introduc­
tory Note to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Muitllateral Trade 
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round) :  Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.1vi. 1, 4 \1994) (quoting then Di­
rector-General Peter Sutherland as emphasizing that the Worid Trade Organi­
zation "will not be a successor agreement to GATT, as defined in the Vienna 
Convention") .  
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sence of a theoretical framework, the intuitions of scholars ana­
lyzing dispute settlement become nothing more than interesting 1 k l .  [ . oac grounG mrormatwn. 
Historical instituti onalism provides a theoretical perspective 
in which understanding dispute settlement under the GATT is of 
critical importance to understanding dispute settlement within 
the '.Y/ orld Trade Organization. Dispute settlement under the 
GATT constituted the antecedent conditions from which dispute 
settlement within the World Trade Organization arose . John 
Croome's  insightful history of the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations reveals several points during the seven years of 
negotiation that might be considered critical junctures; 124 alterna­
tively, the entire negotiations could be considered a cleavage in 
the governance of international trade . 125 In either case, historical 
institutionalism posits that the antecedent conditions impose con­
straints on the choices that are available now--constraints that 
must be understood in order to truly effect analysis of the dispute 
settlement process. 126 Examples of aspects of dispute settlement 
under the World Trade Organization that are best understood in 
historical context include the allowance of multiple complainants 
in one proceeding, 1 27 which is an extension of several proceedings 
in the 1 9 80s and a 1989 decision by the parties to the General 
124 See JOHN CROOM£, RESHAPING THE WORLD TR.'\DING SYSTEM: A 
H1STORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995) . The four years of preparation for 
and seven years of negotiation of the Uruguay Round cannot be summarized in 
one footnote-even a law review footnote. Croome, who particpated in the 
entire span of the Uruguay Round, recalls "the days and nights ot efforts, the 
clashes of policies and personalities, the national pressures on negotiators,  the 
repeated solemn declarations of heads of st�te and government, the frustrations 
and breakthroughs."  !d. at 4. Examples of critical junctures might include the 
1985 clz.sh between developed and developing countries over the need for a new 
round of negotiations (which fundamentally changed perceptions of the Multi 
fibre Arrangement) , id. at 24-25; the circulation by Arthur Dunkel of  his Draft 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations in 
199 1 (which jelled negotiators' opinions and became the new point of reference 
for nerrotiators) , id. at 29 1-94; and the collapse of the Blair House accords on 
a�ricuhure (which very nearly resulted in the failure of the Uruguay Round) , 
iu. at 341 .  
125 See COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 69, at 29-30 & n . 1 4  (discussing such 
cleavage) . 
126 See Thelen & Steinmo, supra note 62, at 3 (arguing that historical con­
straints must be understood) . 
127 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes art. 9, Charter, supra note 123 ,  Annex 2 [hereinafter Understand­
ing]. 
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1 2 8  1 . 1 • • . 
£ . 1 • d 
. 1 29 Agreement; ru es govermng tne part1c1patwn 01 cmr part1es, 
which expand, in interesting ways , the rights given to thir� par-. . D . . b . . G ' /1. ! J O  d tles 1il two eCiswns y parties to the eneral Hgreement; an . 
even the much condemned secrecy of dispute settlement panels, 1 3 1  
which was the emphatic practice o f  panels convened by the 
GATT. 1 32 The trade scholars' intuitions are correct, and are 
given a theoretical niche in historical institutionalism. 
Historical institutional ism gives voice to questi ons that are 
outside the theoretical constructs of regime theory or institutional 
economics . For example, regime theory and institutional eco­
nomics posit a world of autonomous, roughly equal actors. In the 
World Trade Organization, however, there are marked gradations 
of power. The "quad countries, "  consisting of Canada, the Euro­
pean Union, Japan and the United States, are the m ost powerful 
b 1 33  E 
. . d d 1 . . mem ers . mergmg economies an eve opmg countnes, on 
128 See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub­
stances, GATT B.I .S .D. (34th Supp.) at 1 36, 136-37 (1987) ;  United States­
Customs Users Fees, GATT B .I .S .D. (35th Supp.) at 245, 245-46 ( 1988) ;  Con­
ciliation on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Proce­
dures, Apr. 12 ,  1989, GATT B.I .S .D. (36th Supp.) at 61 ,  64 ( 1989) [hereinafter 
1989 Decision]. 
]?9 d d' - See Un erstan mg, supra note 1 27, art . 10 .  
1 30 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Set­
tlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28 ,  1979, GATT B.I .S .D . (26th Supp .) at 2 10, 
2 1 3  (1979) ; 1989 Decision, supra note 128, at 65 .  The rules of the World Trade 
Organization give third part1es access to the submissions of the primary parties, 
a right that they did not enjoy under the rules for dispute settlement under the 
GATT. 
131 See Understanding, supra note 1 27, art . 1 3 (1) & art. 1 4(1) ; see also Jeffrey 
L .  Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA IT, the IC] & Trade-Environment Dis­
putes, 1 5  MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1066 (1994) (castigating closed decisionmaking 
process as "inimical" to sound decisionmaking) ; Robert F. Housman,Democra­
tizing_ International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L  L.J .  699, 7 1 1  (1994) ("The application ofthese ironclad rules of secrecy is perhaps most trou­
bling in the area of GATT dispute resolution.") ; John H. Jackson, World Trade 
Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH .  & LEE L .  
REV. 1 227, 1255  (1992) ("For purposes of  gaining a broader constituency among 
the various policy interested communities in the world . . .  the GATT could go 
much further in providing 'transparency' of its processes . ") .  
J3? - See, e.g. , Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, May 1 5- 1 6, 1984, GATT B.I .S .D. (3 1st Supp.) at 94, 95 (1984/ (recording a decision made by 
a GATT panel) . For a more ful( discussion of tnese and many other aspects of 
the dispute settlement process under the World Trade Organization that stem 
from practices that evolved under the General Agreement, see Philip M. 
Nichols, GA TT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 399-418  (1996) . 
133 See Uruguay Round: Quad Countries Deliver Ratification of Uruguay 
Round World Trade Agreement, Int ' l  Trade Daily (BNA) ( Jan. 3 ,  1995) . 
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the other hand, have entered into a series of shifting alliances. 134 
Historical institutionalism, with its roots in the political scientific 
analysis of power, is well situated to provide a theoretical frame­
work for analysis of this aspect of the World Trade Organiza-. 1 3) non. 
Similarly, sociological institutionalism allows scholars to 
frame questions that do not arise under regime theory or institu­
tional economics. Of these, one of the more interesting has to do 
with sociological institutionalism's observation that institutions 
are a product of and are affected by the culture in which they are 
embedded. 136 The World Trade Organization is a global institu­
tion. 137 Sociological institutionalism would suggest that it is the 
product of a global culture . The existence of a global culture, 
howevers is an issue that is greatly contended but little ex­plored . 13 The insight that culture informs institutions raises sev­
eral questions with respect to the World Trade Organization, 
such as whether, if there is no global culture, the World Trade 
Organization or the rules that it promulgates can truly persist; 
whether the rules issued by the World Trade Organization and 
134  See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT 
LEGAL SYSTEM (1987) ; Robert E. Hudec, GA IT and the Developing Countries, 
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 67. 
135 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61 ,  at 954 (extolling the ability of histori­
cal institutionalism to analyze power) . 
136  d . See supra notes 93-96 an accompanymg text . 
137 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organiza· 
tion Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J.  INT'L ECON. L. 295,  322-23 (1996) (distinguishing the European Union as a federation of culturally related 
nations from the World Trade Organization as a global organization) . As of 
October, 1997, the World Trade Organization had 132 members and 32 ob­
servers from all parts of the world. 
1 38 See, e.g. , ANTHONY D. KING, THE BUNGALOW: THE PRODUCTION OF 
A GLOBAL CULTURE (2d ed. 1995) (using similarities of architectural style in 
India, Britain, North America, Africa, Australia and continental Europe to ar­
gue in favor of the inter-relatedness of worldwide social phenomena) ; William 
Alonso, Citizenship, Nationality and Other Identities, 48 J .  INT'L AFF. 585,  588-
592 (1995) (describing a study that finds some identification with a global cul­
ture, but closer identtfication with local factors) ; Jason Clay, Global Culture is 
Globaloney, UTNE READER, Jan./Feb. 1996, 36 at 37 (arguing that the putative 
global culture is really a I?rofit-oriented manipulation 'by those with an interest 
tn marketing the concept) ; Mel van Elteren, Conceptualizing the Impact of U.S. 
Popular Culture Globally, 30 J. POPULAR CULTURE 47 (1996) (statmg that the 
spread of U.S. culture 1s due to an increase in capitalistic consumensm rather 
than a global culture, but noting that the spread has the effect of homogenizing 
culture worldwide) . 
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other international economic organizations will engender a global 
culture; and how a thin global culture would constrain the func­
tioning and enforcement of the ·world Trade Organization's  rules 
and policies . Unfortunately, sociologists have only begun to 
scratch the surface of international institutions, and offer little 
• 1 139 T h 1 h • • ' b • 1 • 1 • guwance. N onet �e ess , t e questwns ra1sed y socw10g1ca m-
stitutionalism are of obvious interest to trade law scholars. 
3 .  THE QUESTION OF SCHOLARLY LINKAGE 
3. 1 .  Institutional Explanations a/Historical Institutionalism 's 
and Sociological institutionalism 's Lack of Influence on the 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization 
It is apparent that regime theory and economic institutional­
ism do not exhaust the universe of institutionalisms . It is also ap­
parent that other forms of institutionalism can p rovide a useful 
prism for the scrutiny of international law in general, and for 
analysis of the World Trade Organization in particular. The ob­
vious question, therefore, is why these alternat ive forms of insti­
tutionalism are not widely used. Interestingly, the alternative in­
stitutionalisms themselves provide possible answers to this 
question. In order to embark upon this analysis, it is  necessary to 
accept that legal scholarship is itself an institution, replete with 
formal and informal rules, motivated actors, and shared cogni-
. 1 40 uons . 
The first means by which to examine the scholarly l inkages 
that have already occurred is through historical i nstitutionalism. 
Historical institutionalism emphasizes path dependency. Future 
direction is conditioned by the past; significant change occurs at 
critical junctions or points of cleavage. Against this background, 
it is interesting to turn to a story related by the comparative legal 
scholar Alan Watson. Watson is not a historical institutionalist, 
. m. But see, e.g. , David Stra_;:.g & John W. Meyer, Institutional Conditions for 
Diffuswn, m INSTITUTIONAL .eNVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 100 (w. 
Richard Scott & John W. Meyer eels . ,  1994) (analyzing ho·w institutions a±fect 
cultural diffusion) . 
140 See Nancy L.  Cook, Outside the Tradition: L iterature as Legal Scholarship, 
63 U. CINN. L. REV. 95, 148 (1 994) (stating that the development of legal schol­
arship is like that of "any inst itution"') ; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems 
Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 479-8 1 (1 997) (discussing the func-
. r 1 1 1 • h'  ) nons or ega scnolars 1p/ . 
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b h 
. . d . h 1 d 1 d t 1 4 1  WT ut e too 1s mtereste m ow aws eve op an cnange . w at-
son attributes one factor in the development and change in legal 
.d d "  h " 1 42 H 1 · systems to acc.t ent an c ance . .1 e re ates a story concermng 
the development of law in South Africa. A South African physi­
cian happened upon one of Watson's books, Legal Transplants, in 
a bookstore shortly before a return flight to South Africa. The 
physician, who assumed that the book dealt with the law of medi­
cal transplants, purchased the book. Although the book actually 
deals with the transplant and reception of laws, the physician en­
joyed the book and, after a series of letters with Watson, provided 
Watson with funds to edit a translation of Justinian's Digest. The 
translation was made available in South Africa, where it resulted 
in a measurable increase in the use of Roman law in South Afri­
can legal decisions. 143 In relating this story, Watson revels in dis­
cussing the chance or accidental nature of this line of legal devel-
144 h • • • r h f h opment . W at 1s most mterestmg tor t e purposes o t e 
present analysis, however, is Watson's observation that the intro­
duction of a single text into South African jurisprudence had tre­
mendous impact on the formulation of South African law. 145 
Abbott's article on regime theory was not accidentally pur­
chased on the way to an airport .  The lesson of Watson's  story, 
however, is apparent. Abbott 's  article shaped the direction of in­
ternational legal scholarship, and conditioned its path toward ac­
ceptance and use of regime theory. 146 Burley's  synthesis further 
constrained international law scholarship . 147 Had Abbott written 
1 4 1  See, e.g. , ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985). 
1 42  Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 ,  341 
(1996) .  Altogether, Watson suggests four factors: utility of the transplanted 
law, accident and chance, difficulties of clear sight, and the authority enhancing 
effect of the transplanted law. See id. at 335-45. 
143 See id. at 340. 
144 It should be noted that neither economic institutionalism nor regime 
theory �re eq�ipped t� interp�et this story. In�eed, Watson fimsel_f is r�duced to labelmg th1s factor chance. !d. at 339. He also notes that "[p ]unsts wtll ob­
ject and say that I am relying on anecdotal evidence. Yes, I am. But that in no 
way impairs my argument . . . .  [c]hance cannot systematically be factored into 
any development ." Id. at 341 . Historical institutionalism provides a theoretical 
means of categorizing this critical junction in the development of South African 
law. 
145 See id. at 340-41 .  
1�6 See supra note 30 (noting that scholars who used regime theory analysis 
acknowledged Abbott) . 
147 See supra note 2 1  (relating plaudits for Burley) . 
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an article expounding the application of historical institut ionalism 
to legal theory,  or had Burley explicated a detailed history of so­
ciology rather than international relations theory, it is probable 
that the landscape of international law scholarship in general and 
of analysis of the incernational trade regime in particular would 
be quite different today. 
Such a story rnay seem incomplete-it begins abruptly with 
the publication of Abbott ' s  article. A lingering question remains: 
from where did this article arise? While only A bbott can fully 
answer that question, he does provide a clue in the article itself. 
That clue, in turn, can be placed within the structure of sociologi­
cal institutionalism. Abbott opines that international relations 
theory, from which regime theory is taken, is the closest of the 
social sciences to international law scholarship. 148 In sociological 
institutionalism terms, Abbott is  culturally predisposed, p erhaps 
even constrained, to borrow from international relations theory. 
This is true both cognitively and with respect to legitimization. 
Cognitively, Abbott 's  writings indicate that he is steeped in 
knowledge of institutionalism and that he is a profound re­
searcher. As a scholar trained in international law and interna­
tional relations, however, he simply may not have "seen" histori-· 
cal or sociological institutionalism. With respect to 
legitimization, Abbott may, consciously or unconsciously, have 
considered borrowing from a related social science to be more ap­
propriate than borrowing from political science or sociology_ 1 49 
148 Abbott, supra note 10, at 342; see also Burley, supra note 2 1 ,  at 205 ("Just 
�s constitutional lawyers study political. th�ory, and political theorist� i�q�ire 
mto the nature and substance of const1tut1ons, so too should two dJscplmes 
that study the laws of state behavior seek to learn from one another.") . 
149 q Edward L.  Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal 
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889,  900 (1992) (noting that methodological com­
mitment tends to bind legal scholars and diminish acceptance of  alternatives) . 
Indeed, some aspects of historical institutionalism and sociological institutional­
ism may seem to some le�al scholars to resonate with the deconstructionist al­
l ies of the school of crit1cal legal studies, which is anathema to many U.S. 
scholars and thus would not be considered institutionally appropriate. In addi­
tion to criticism of its logic, deconstructionism is criticized as contributing to 
excessive cynicism and mhilism while contributing nothing positive to legal 
theory. See, e.g. ,  DAVID C. HOY & THOMAS MCCARTHY, CRITICAL THEORY 
(1994) (criticiz.mg deconstructionism) ; Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism A bout 
Practic,-zf Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 7 1 4, 743 (1994) 
(criticizing deconstructionism) ; Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legisla­
tive Veto, 68 �AINN. L. REV . 4T.? , 540-41 (1984) (questioning whether decon­
struction adds anyt hing to legal ;:;.nalysis) ; see also Vivian Gross·wald Curran, De­
construction, Stnu:trmdlsm, A ntisemitism and the Law, 36 B . C. L. REV.  1 (1994) 
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A similar story can be told with respect to economic institu­
tionalism, although net quite as directly. The modern law 2-nd 
economics m ovement probably began when Aaron Director, an 
economist at the U niversitv of Chicago , introduced several mem-
.- . . ' / . 150  bers or that umversJ.ty s lav1 faculty to economiC theory . From 
that beginning, law and economics has gone through several intel­
lectual generations, b,��oming more broadly distributed through­
out legal scho larship . d l  Thus) it is not possible to draw a straight 
line from Director -to Trachtman, as it is from Abbott to Shell . 152 
Nonetheless, a historical institutionalist might argue that at a 
critical juncture , when legal scholarship was receptive to a new 
paradigm, D irector's protegees sent legal scholarship along the 
path of law and economics, and that the choices available to legal 
scholarship are now constrained by that choice. 153 Under this 
line of reasoning, it would be considered institutionally likely that 
a scholar would apply institutional economics to the �! orld Trade 
(outlining criticisms of deconstructionism, from a perspective sympathetic to 
deconstructionism) . The difference, of course, is that while deconstructionism 
simply posits that words have no objective meaning, historical institutional ism 
and soc10logical institutionalism pos1t that the meaning attributable to various 
cognitions may be attributable w several sets of rules, mcluding self-referential 
rules. 
150 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 3 1 6-30 
(1995) (discussing the be�inning and early history of law and economics) . 
Among the first law faculty that Director worked on were Robert Bork and 
Richard Posner. See id. An interesting history, albeit recounted very subjec­
tively by actual participants, of the nascence of the modern law and economics 
movement is Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and 
Economics at Chicago, 1932- 1970, 26 J .L.  & ECON. 1 63 (1983/ (reproducing a 
transcript of a discussion among a number of members of the 1aw c>.nd econom­
ics school) . Intellectually, modern law and economics may have its roots in  
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J .L.  & ECON. 1 (1960) , and 
Guido Calabre:;i, Some Thoughts on R isk Distribution and the Law of Tom, 70 
YALE L.J. 499 (1961) . See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
LAW 19-20 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the influence of the two articles) . 
1 5 1  See POSNER, supra note 1 50, at 19-20 (outlining a history of the law and 
economics school) ;  Gary Minda, The Jurispmdential Mo�·ements of the 1980s, 50 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 604-1 3  (1989) (same) ; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and Eco­
nomics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 233 
(Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989) (explainin� the basic ideas of the 'Chicago' and 
'Reformist ' schools of b_w and economics; . 
152 Shell himself draws that line. See supra note 3 1 .  
153 Robert Ellickson reports that the percentage o f  law faculty with Ph.D . 's 
in economics grew considerably from 1960 to 1970 . See Robert C. Ellickson, 
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational A ctors: A Critique of Classical 
Law and Econoraics, 65 CHI.-KHH L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1989) . 
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Organization, 1 54 and unlikely that institutionalism from another 
school of thought would be applied . 
. Again, this story seems incomplete-its conclusion of inevita­
bility seems rather self-fulfill ing. And again, sociologicai institu­
tionalism may offer a more satisfying explanation.  Sociological 
institutionalism argues that institutions will be created or changed 
. h .d d . 1 55 L d . . tn ways t .at are cons1 ere appropnate.  aw an economiCs 1s 
wildly controversial as a theoretic for legal scholarship, 1 56, but it 
nonetheless has earned a position as a legitimate heuristic . b7 Just 
as importantly, law and economics analysis has become a proven 
route }or ensuring publication and obtaining tenure and promo­
tion. bB It is difficult to make the same claim for political science 
or sociology, particularly in recent years . 1 59 Thus, culturally, it is 
more legitimate and appropriate to borrow fro m  i nstitutional 
154 Recounting this line of reasoning is not meant to imply that Tracht-
man's analysis is neither original nor well executed. It is both, m abundance. 
1 " 5  ' See Scott , supra note 97, at 1 69-70. 
156 See A very Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Eco­
nomics, 94 MICH. L .  REV. 2229, 2260 ( 1996) ("The tension among efficiency, 
equity, and other aspects of justice remains as controversial as ever in public 
discourse.") ; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 ,  8 (1986) (noting that law and economics is controversial because it makes 
radical assumptions and because it reduces values to preferences) . 
1 57 See Linz Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Femin ism, Law and Economics, 
and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance: A Tentative Case for Cross-Jurisp_rudential 
Dialogue, 20 HOFSTRA L.  REV. 1017 ,  1045 (1992) (noting that wh1le the as­
sumptions of law and economics are controversial, the methodology is not, be­
cause it is simply the methodology of economics) ; see also Gregory S .  Crespi, 
The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confron ting the Prob­
lems ofNonfalsifiabz[ity and Normatzve Bzas, 67 NOTRE DAME L .  REV. 23 1 ,  23 1 -
32 (199 1) (discussing the influence of law and economics) . 
158 See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 752, 765 (1988) ("In his Maccabean lecture on jurisprudence in 
1981 ,  Guido Calebresi reported the current opinion that law and economics 
was the only sure route to promotion and tenure.") ;  Mark Tushnet,Critical Le­
gal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L .J .  1515, 1519 n . 1 8  (1991)  ("I am hard­
pressed to identify a leading law faculty that has denied tenure to someone 
prominently identified as a . . .  law and economics person, and find it absurdly 
easy to identify law faculties that have denied tenure to [critical legal studies] 
peo�le. ") . 59 An exception might be the Yale School of International Law, which 
professed to borrow from sociology (although now a dated sociology) , and 
which occasionally is itself explicitly borrowed from. See, e.g. , David J. Gerber, 
International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an A nalytical Frame-
1.£.;ork, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 ,  543 n. 125 (1988) (borrowing from the Yale 
School, ::tlbeit in a domestic context) . The Yale School is discussedsupra note 
1 1 5 .  
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economics than from historical institutionalism or sociological in-
� • 1 • stttutwna11sm. 
Regime theory and institutional economics are singularly un­
helpful in explaining why they are the dominant institutionalisms 
used to analyze the World Trade Organization. Regime theory is 
inapplicable to a question of the institution of scholarship , but its 
principles would suggest that a number of autonomous scholars 
with relatively equal power selected regime theory and institu­
tional economics as the most effective means of obtaining their 
preferences (which, hopefully, would be a clearer theoretical and 
practical understanding of the World Trade Organization) . Insti­
tutional economics would make a similar argument, substituting 
efficient for effective. These self-congratulatory arguments, how­
ever, are wrong; it has already been demonstrated that historical 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism offer unique and 
valuable insights into the World Trade Organization . 16° Clearly, 
the explanations suggested by historical · institutionalism and so­
ciological institutionalism are the more persuasive. 
3. 2. W1ry Other A nalytical Linkages May Not Exist 
The inquiry into why historical institutionalism and socio­
logical institutionalism have not been used in the analysis of the 
World Trade Organization sheds light on another area of interest 
to trade scholars. 'Why have certain analytical l inkages not been 
drawn? This question is of particular interest, because trade 
scholars should not assume that their repertoire for analysis, sim­
ply because it is bulky,  is complete. 
An example of a linkage that has not been drawn,  for exam­
ple, is that between the World Trade Organization and ethics. 
What is particularly puzzling is the fact that trade scholars have 
not drawn from the rapidly growing body of literature concern­
ing business ethics, 16 1 particularly that branch of business ethics 
h . . 1 b 
. 162 t at concerns mternatwna usmess. 
160 See supm notes 1 2 1- 1 39 and accompanying text. 
161  The field of business ethics is rapidly becoming big business . 
Among other developments, the last fifteen years have seen the prol if­
eration of a great number of books and articles on ethical problems in 
business; the emergence of several centers and institutes at least partly 
devoted to the subJeCt or to related problems l ike the role of values in 
scientific, technological or public policy work; the spread of business 
ethics courses in both college and business school curricula; and even,  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
500 U. Pa. J lnt 'l Econ. L. [Vol 19 :2 
Integrated social contract theory, as explicated by Thomas 
Dunfee and Thomas Donaldson, for example, has become a 
widely explored analytical tool in the field of business ethics . 1 63 It 
has also found expression in general management literature. In 
legal literature on trade, however, there are no refe rences to this 
school of thought. 1 64 
Integrated social contract theory is based on, but radically ex­
tends, the tradition of social contract theorists such as Locke and 
Rousseau. 165 Integrated social contract theory adopts the appella­
tion "integrated" because it unites two distinct types of social con-
i� some corporations, the development of seminars in ethics for execu­
tives. 
Robert Jackall, Business as Social and Moral Terrain, in PERSPECTIVES IN 
BUSINESS ETHICS 77, 77 (Laura Pincus Hartman ed., 1998) . 
162 See, e.g. , BUSINESS ETHICS: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eels. ,  1993) ; THOMAS DON­
ALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1989) . 
163 See Jeffrey Nesteruk, 1he Moral Dynamics of Law in Business, 34 AM. 
Bus. L.J .  133 ,  133  (1996) (stating that "v1rtue ethics and social contract the­
ory . . .  are increasingly influencing our understanding of ethical issues in busi­
ness") ; Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory, Social Contracts, and a Principle 
of Fairness 1 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) 
("Prominent among the myriad proposed models of business ethics are stake­
holder theory and social contract theory. The latter has, in fact, been suggested 
as a normative grounding for the former.") . A very clear explanation of inte­
grated social contract theory can be found in DAVID J . FRITZCHE, BUSINESS 
ETHICS: A GLOBAL AND MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 43-47 (1997) .  
164 In legal literature as a whole there are virtually no references to inte­
grated social contract theory. Moreover, the only two references found by the 
author of this Article are brief, and do not attempt to borrow from or integrate 
the theory into legal theory. In corporate law, Timothy Fort borrows Dunfee 
and Donaldson's criticism of stake.fiolder theory. See Timothy L. Fort, 1he 
Corporation as Mediating Institution: An  Ef icacious Synthesis of Stakeholder The­
ory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L.  REV . 173 ,  1 88-89 
(1997) . Steve Salbu refers to the concept of moral free space, but does not pres­
ent integrated social contract theory as a model . See Steven R. Salbu, True 
Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the 
Preservation of Colloqu1_ in Emerging Global Communities, 1 5  U. PA . J .  INT'L 
Bus.  L. 327, 348 n.73 \1994) .  It should b e  noted that Professor Fort teaches at 
the University of Michigan's business school, and that Professor  Salbu received 
his Ph.D. partially under the supervision of Dunfee. Both facts reinforce the 
path dependency of legal scholarship . 
165 See Michael Keeley, Continuing the Social Contract Condition ,  5 Bus. 
ETHICS Q. 241 (1995) (stating that Donaldson and Dunfee's work extends the 
work of the Sophists and of Locke to modern organizations) . 
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tracts . 166 The first type is  a hypothetical macrosocial contract 
among all of the members of a given society, the contents of 
which are all of the economic rules to which all of the members 
would agree. 167 Obviously, this will not be a great number of 
rules. The result is moral free space within that hypothetical 
macrosocial contract . Inside that moral free space, communities 
are free to enter into the second type of social contract : explicit 
contracts that provide more detailed rules concerning ethical be­
havior in economic life . 1 68 These microsocial contracts are 
bounded only by hypernorms, which are "principles so funda­
mental to human existence that they serve as a guide in evaluating 
lower level moral norms," 1 69 and by a re'\uirement that individual 
members have consented to the contract . 70 Because membership 
in different economic communities may overlap, thus creating 
overlapping systems of rules within the moral free space of the 
macrosocial contract, Dunfee and Donaldson have devised a set of 
priority rules to determine which set should apply in a given . . 1 7 1 situatiOn. 
Dunfee defines communities as "all coherent groupings of 
people capable of generating ethical norms . . .  includ[ing] a cor­
poration, a department or other subgroup within a corporation, a 
social club, an industry association, a faculty senate, a church or  
synagogue, a city government, an  association of  trial lawyers and 
166 See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Con­
ception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 252, 254 (1994) (explaining the appellation) . 
167 See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Con­
tracts Theory: A Communitarian Conception of Economic Ethics, 1 1  ECON. & 
PHIL. 85 ,  93 (1995) (explaining the hypothetical macrosocial contract) . 
168 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 66, at 260-62 (discussing moral 
free space); Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 67 ,  at 93-95 (discussing microso­
cial contracts that fill in the moral free space) . 
169 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 66, at 265; see also Thomas W. Dun­
fee, The Role of Ethics in International Business, in BUSINESS En-nes: jAPAN 
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 1 62, at 63, 69 ("Hypernorms are de­
fined as norms so fundamental to human existence that they w1ll be reflected in 
a convergence of religious, political, and philosophical thought. Hypernorms 
thus represent core or fundamental values common to many cultures.") .  
170 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 67,  at 98 .  Consent can be indicated 
by, among other means, not takmg advantage of an opportunity to exit. See id. 
at 99.  
1 71 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 66, at 268-71 (outlining priority 
rules for determining which community's rules apply) . 
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, 17'  f' l  1 h w 1 • 'T' 1 ---- • • • so on . � '-'1ear1y , t .. e orld 1 rade Urgamzatlon consntutes a 
community under this definition. Just as clearly, legal scholarship 
on the World Trade Organization could benefit from the disci­
pline that integrated social contract theory brings to consideration 
of the issue of ethics in an economic setting, and from a theory 
that "allows for moral diversity among various cultures while 
maintaining certain universal norms. " 173 And yet, it does not . 
That legal scholarship h as not availed itself of this or  other 
analytics from the discipline of business ethics m ay be explained 
by the insights of historical institutionalism and sociological insti­
tutionalism. Historically and culturally, there h as been l ittle in­
tellectual exchange between legal scholarship and business schol­
arship . 174 An example is i l lustrative. The concept of "core 
competencies" is a staple in management sciences and other sci­
ences related to the study of businesses . 175 Out of the estimated 
five thousand law review articles published each year, 176 however, 
a search of the LEXIS electronic database reveals only sixteen ref­
erences to core competencies . Of these, five could in  no way be 
construed as a reference to business theory, 1 77 four were made by 
172 Dunfee, supra note 169,  at 68 .  "Thus defined, communities are groups 
that determine their own membership and apply their own preferred forms of 
rationality." !d. 
173 FRITZSCHE, supra note 163 ,  at 43 . 
1 74 See Ronald J .  Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and 
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J .  239, 303-05 (1984) (castigating legal scholarship and 
education for its lack of integration with business theory) . 
175 For an early and often-cited discussion of core competencies, see C.K. 
Prahalad & Gar/ Hamel , The Core Competence of the Corporation, HARV. Bus. 
REV. ,  May-June 1990, at 79. 
176 Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship A mok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and 
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REv. 926, 928 (1990) . 
177 See Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on Tuming Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 989,  1000 (1997) 
(discussing clinical experience at the University of Tennessee) ; Teresa V. Carey, 
Credentialing for Mediators-To Be or Not To Be?, 30 U.S.F.  L .  REV. 635 ,  640 
(1996) (discussing the attributes necessary for a mediator) ;  Rob Frieden ,Privati­
zation of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering a Golden Goose?, 36  VA. J .  INT'L L. 
1001 ,  1 007 (1996) (d1scussing the language of the INMARSAT Convention) ; 
Emmanuel P .  Mastromanolis, Insights from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and 
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for 
European Union Competition Law, 1 5  U. PA. J .  INT'L Bus. L. 559, 591. (1995) 
(diswssing attributes of traders) ; Donald T .  Weckstein, Mediator Cert{z.cation: 
Why and How, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 767 (1996) (discussing training ir.t the ba­
sic attributes of a mediator) . 
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l 1 d . b . . 1 78 attorneys w n o  were emp oye m usmess settmgs , one was . ' . . h h 1 h 1 79 made by a busmessperson w o au.t o rea a very s o rt comment, · 
d t b t 1 8 0  0 f 11 . . an two were made y students. ut o a 1 Sixteen, only one 
actually used the concept at length. 1 8 1 By contrast, a search in the 
same database of the term "efficiency" yields 17,792 references; of 
the term "efficient allocation,"  1 ,056 references; of "Coase Theo­
rem," 707 references; of "elasticity of demand," 684 references . 
Even the term "David Ricardo" yields ninety references . Clearly, 
management theory is not part of the culture of legal scholarship 
in any meaningful way, whereas economic theory appears in 
abundance. 
The insights of historical institutionalism and sociological in­
stitutionalism-that legal scholarship's past and present culture 
lead it to certain linkages and away from others-reflects neither 
well nor poo rly on legal scholarship, it is simply an observable 
phenomenon. Awareness of possible institutional limitations on 
178 See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 1 527, 1 530 n.8 (1996) (Becker was Associate General Counsel of the 
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO) ; Ward Bower, Law Firm 
Economics and Professionalism, 1 00 DICK. L. REV. 5 1 5, 529 (1996) (Ward was a 
principal of a management consultant group) ; Thomas A. Piraino, J r.,R.econcil­
ing Competition and Cooperation: A New A ntitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871 ,  887 (1994) (Piraino was a Vice-President of 
Parker·Hannifan Corporation) ; Paul R. Verkuil,Reverse Yardstick Competition: 
A New Deal {or the Nineties, 45 FLA. L. REV. 1 ,  17 (1993) (Verkuil was President 
and CEO of the American Automobile Association) . 
1 79 See Ronald Mitsch, Innovation as Part of the U.S. Corporate Culture: In­
novation Working {or You, 2 1  CAN.-U.S. LJ. 1 7 1 ,  174 (1995) (Mitsch was Ex­
ecutive Vice Pres1dent of the 3M Company) . 
1 80 See William Kummel, Note, A Market Approach to Law Firm Economics: 
A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Le­
gal Services, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 379, 399 n.65 (discussing law firms' 
competitive strategies) ; Nicholas A. Widnell ,  Comment, The Crystal Rdl of In· 
novation Market A nalysis in Merger Review: A n  Appropriate Means of Predicting 
the Future?, 4 GEO. 1v1ASON L REV. 369, 393 (1996) (suggesting an approach for 
measuring market concentration for innovation) . 
1 8 1  See Jeffery Atik, Complex Enterprises and Quasi-Public Goods, 1 6  U. PA.  
J. INT'L Bus. L.  1 ,  30 (1995) . Mark Lemley also briefly explains the term, and 
Ann E. Conaway Stilson mentions it in a way that implies part of the underly­
ing concept. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics a/Improvement in InteLlectual 
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989 , 1049 n.279 (1997) ;  Ann E.  Conaway Stil­
son, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL. J .  CORP. L.  497, 527 (1997) . The 
remaining reference is made by the former Vice Chairman of the Zambia Priva­
t ization Agency. See Benjamin Lubinda Ngenda, Comparatirr.Je };fodels of Pri'Va· 
tization: A Commentary on the African Experience, 21  BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179, 
1 82 (1995) . This survey of legal literature 1s, of course, subject to the limitations 
of any electronic database search. 
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scholarly l inkages creates the opportunity to transcend t.hose bar-. . . . 1 8 '  f . . . . 1 ' ' f..C ners m mnovatlve ways. - Awareness o� the mstltutwna, d1 n-
culties inherent in scholarly l inkage also sheds light on problems 
of practical linkage between societal issues and the \Xf orld Trade 
Organization.  
4 .  THE TRIALS OF S CHOLARLY LIN'tCAGE SHED LIGHT O N  ISSUES 
OF PRACTICAL LINKAGE 
The importance of theory and of scholarly analysis of the 
World Trade Organization cannot be gainsaid. Arguably, the 
�World Trade Organization owes its very existence to scholarly 
1 . J L . . 1 d . 1 83 N h 1 . . ana ys1s 01 t!l. e mternatwna tra e regime. onet e ess, 1t 1s 
important to consider the implications of the preceding section, 
discussing scholarly linkages, on practical linkages that are asked 
of the \vorld Trade Organization in the real ·world. Those link­
ages are considerable, and growing. The World Trade Organiza­
tion is not yet five years old, but it has already been suggested as 
the appropriate forum for the promulgation of rules concerning 
labor) investment, transnational bribery) human rights, antitrust, 
the environment, gender and racial discrimination, taxation, and 
the development of democracy. 184 While it is clear that not all of 
132 See Rubin, supra note 1 49,  at 901 (discussing the benefits that accrue 
from shifts in mainstream scholarship) . 
183 At the outset of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
of course, the creation of an international organization was not contemplated. 
While, however, the Uruguay Round was proceedin�, the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs commissioned Professor John JacKson to conduct a study 
of the international trade regime. Jackson suggested that only the creation of 
an international organization would bring coherency to the management of in­
ternational trade regulation. His study was embraced by the European Com­
munity, which formally proposed the creation of such <J.n organization. See 
Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road frorn CA TT to MTO, 3 MINN. 
J .  GLOBAL TRADE 35 ,  41 -42 (1994) ; see afso JOHN H. JACKSON, RE­
STRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 91 - 103 (1990) (Chapter 8 entitled 
"Reforming the GATT System") . It is interesting to note that at the time he 
wrote his study, Jackson considered the creation of an actual international or­
ganization "improbable" and suggested that analyzil!g it as a hypothetical 
"mi��.t. �unher stimulate th,ought� about some of the difficult institutional prob­lem., vf .. he GATT system. !d. ac 93 . 
134 See, e.g. , William Diebold, Some Second Thoughts, 10  AM. U. J .  INT'L L. 
&� Po�.'Y .125 1 ,  1�57 (1�95) (suggesting that t�e World Trade O,_E�anization _issue rules tor mternat10nal mvestment) ; Claus D1eter-Ehlermann, J ne !nternatwnal 
�!imens�on o[ Compe.tition, Policy, }7 FC?RD!-IAM INT•L LJ . 833 ,  840 (1994) (suggest!ng t£.\ at the \Verla Trade Urgamzatwn promulgate rules on competi­
tion policy) ; John H. Jackson,Reflections on InternationaL Economic La·w, 17 U. 
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l . k •j • 1 1 1 85 . . 1 1 1 t i. 86 these m ag;es are C1es1rao e, 1t 1s equa < y c_ear tr1at sorr1e are . 
The alternative in.stitutionalisms may shed light on t wo qu_.:.::stions 
concerning practical linkages: how to discern which linkages are 
desirable, and how to effectuate those desirable linkages. 
The author of this A rticle has pubiished an article on deter­
mining what issues are proper subjects for consideration by the 
1 1  �..... • o • • '1 87 Th • • r • • Wor a 1 rade rgamzatwn .  at art1cle suggests tour cntena 
that must be satisfied for an issue to fall  within the W odd Trade 
Organization's mandate :  that the issue be within the legal compe­
tency of the ':xr orld Trade Organization, that the issue signifi­
cantly involve trade, that the World Trade Organization be cap a·· 
ble of enforcing any guidelines related to the issue, and that the 
. . . . l d
. . 1 88 Tl 
. . 
1ssue reqmre mternatwna coor 1nat10n. nese cntena are ex-
plicitly drawn from the nature of the World Trade Organizalion 
as an international institution and from the purposes of its crea­
tors.1 89 In that sense, these criteria  reflect the rational and utilitar-
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 17 ,  23-24 (1996) (suggesting that the World Trade Or­
ganization will be called upo n  to issue rules concernina the environment,  anti­
trust and competition, labor standards , human rights, distributional issues, gen­
der and other discrimination, and democratic structure) ; Philip M. Nichols, 
Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organizatwn , 28 L 
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305 (1996) ;  Asif H. Qureshi, Trade Related A specrs of Inter· 
national Taxation-A New \.VTO Code of Conduct?, J .  WORLD TRADE, Apr. 
1996, at 161 (suggesting the World Trade Organization as a forum for the 
promulgation of uniform trade-related tax regulations) ; Thoma,s J .  Schoen­baum, The lntematzon"1.l Trade Laws and the New Protectzon zsm: Toe Need for a 
Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.  J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393 ,  394 (1994) 
(sugges�ing that th� Wo�ld T_rade Organization take up the issue of �ntitrust regulat10n) ; James 1' .  Sm1th, NAFTA and Human Rzghts: A Necessary Lmica.f.e, 27 
U.C. DA V1S L. REV. 793, 836 (1994) ("Over t ime it may be possible to explicitly 
l ink membership in the WTO to adherence to [human rights conditions] . ") . 
185 See Philip M . Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organiza tion: Dis­
cerning the Limits of the World Trade Organization 's Authority, 2 3  N.Y.U. J .  
INT'L L. & POL. 7 1 1 ,  7 14- 1 8  ( 1996) (arguing that excessive l inkage would dilute 
the clarity of the World Trade Organization's mandate, undermine its credibil­
ity, and place issues in its hands that would best be considered elsewhere) . 
186 The author of this Article has argued, for example, that the World 
Trade Organization should deal with the issue of transnational bribery. See 
Nichols, supra note 1 84 .  
1 87  See .Nichols, mpra note 1 8 5 .  
1 8 8  See id. at 722-40. 
iS9 'd (" "  . f. 11 h . . . . .  r See z . at 719  �peC! lCa y, t e quest10n requtres an und.erstandmg o  
what type of international organization the World Trade Organization is, and 
what it ts intended by its creators and members to accomplish . ") . The analysis 
relies on the taxonomy of international organizations created by Paul Taylor in 
its  effort to define and characterize the World Trade Organization.  See Paul 
Taylor, A Conceptual Typology of lntemational Organization, in FR.AI·IiEWORKS 
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ian orientation of regime theory (as well as institutional econom­
ics) 1 90 although that iteration of institutionalism is not explicitly 
referred to in the article) . In other words, these criteria examine 
intrinsic characteristics of the \\' orld Trade Organization as a re­
gime and apply them outward. They do not reflect the historical 
or cultural orientation of historical institutionalism or  sociologi­
cal institutionalism. They do not examine constraints imposed 
upon the \Vorld Trade Organization through past decisions at 
critical junctures. They do not examine the culture in which the 
World Trade Organization is embedded to determine if linkage 
with some issues would be more appropriate t han linkage with 
other issues . These types of analysis are not typical to mainstream 
trade scholarship, but nonetheless would provide interesting in­
sights into the question of the scope of the World Trade Organi­
zation's authority. 
An example of a practical linkage that might be excluded un­
der regime theory is a linkage between trade and human rights. 1 9 1  
Trade and human rights have not been linked in  the status quo . 192 
Particularly given regime theories ' assumptions that actors in the 
international arena are autonomous and equal, regime theory 
might lead to a conclusion that such a linkage would render the 
international trade regime inadequate in effectuating members ' 
preferences . 1 93 Because regime theory predicates institutional 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPER..!\TION 12 (A.J .R. Groom & Paul Taylor eds . ,  
1990) . 
190 See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55  OHIO ST. L.J .  78 1 ,  807 
(1994) (stating that regime theory can be compared to economics because it 
treats states as unitary, rational, ma..ximizing actors) . 
1 9 1 Patricia Stirling, for example, advocates the creation of a human rights 
body within the World Trade Organization that will oversee the administra­
tion of multilateral enforcement of human rights though trade sanctions. See 
Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Ba· 
sic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 1 1  
AM. U. J .  lNT'L L.  & POL'Y 1 ,  4 (1996) .  
192 See Smith, supra note 1 84, at 8 1 9  n .95 (noting that in the reai world, 
human rights regimes and commercial regimes are wholly independent of one 
another, and using the separation of the World Trade Orgamzation and the 
United Nations as an example) . 
1 93 The criteria for determining which issues are proper for consideration 
by the -world Trade Organization that are discussed supra notes 1 87- 1 89 and 
accompanying text almost certainly would exclude this proposal . This proposal would not be considered within the scope of the Wond Trade Orgamzat10n's 
authority because it would fail tests number two (that is, resolution of this issue 
would not significantly increase trade) and number three (that is, it would be 
very difficult for the World Trade Organization to supervise enforcement of 
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h ,r.r; . h h . ' . . . l d b 19.d. change on 1 ow e11 ectzve t e c ange m the 1nstrtut1on wou .- e ,  · 
upon receiving a negative answer it would resist the change . 
Sociological institutionalism asks a different question. Rather 
than concerning itself with the utilitarian effectiveness of the in­
stitution, sociological institutionalism asks whether the contem­
plated change would render the institution more legitimate, that 
is, whether it would be considered more appropriate for the 
\Xf orld Trade Organization to establish linkage with human rights 
than it would be for the Organization not to do so. "X'hile this 
Article does not delve into the myriad debates over human rights, 
there is a body of international l aw scholarship that concludes 
that human rights principals have achieved almost universal ac­
ceptance . 195 Interestingly, some of that scholarship suggests that 
the increased acceptance of human rights principles has proceeded 
hand in hand with increased acceptance of the globalization of 
commerce. 196 If indeed it can be demonstrated that a demand for 
core human rights forms part of the cultural context in which the 
World Trade Organization is embedded, and if it can be shown 
that a connection between those core rights and international 
commercial regulation is considered appropriate, then sociological 
institutionalism, unlike reqime theory, might provide a theoreti­
cal justification for linkage. 97 
The alternative institutionalisms might also provide instnlC­
tion in how to effectuate linkage . Regime theory and institu-
any rules that it promulgated on the subject) . These criteria, it should be re­
called, reflect a regime theory orientation toward institutions. 
194 s . 8 d . ee supra note 1 an accompanymg text. 
195 See, e.g. , Jost Del�riick, A More Effective International Law or a New 
'TVor!d Law"?-Some Aspects of the Development o r  International Law in a 
Changing International System, 68 IND. L .J. 705, 713 (1993) ("Human dignity, as 
the anchor point for the normative validity of international human rights law 
and as a basK guiding principle for their interpretation and application, has be­
come more firmly established within the international community than ever 
before. ") ; Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal A trocities, 89 AM J. INT'L L. 554, 554 (1995) (noting the feneral acceptance of human 
rights as a subject for international regulation) ; A1ex Y. Seita, Globalization and 
the Converf£ence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 447 (1997) (noting that 
"the rhetonc of human rights has gained universal acceptance") . 
196 See De!briick, supra note 195, at 7 1 3  (stating that "individual rights and 
fundamentJl freedoms are accepted, in principle,  along with economic . . .  
rights"); Seita, supra note 195, at 447 (arguing that the acceptance of human 
rights goes hand m hand with economic globalizat ion) .  
1 97 This hypothetical i s  provided only as an example, and should not be 
construed as a fully developed argument for, or against, such a linkage . 
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tional economics rely on the self-interest of actors to effectuate a 
change in institutions; clearly, however, this theoretical device is 
not perfectly applicable in the real world. 1 98 An actor cannot 
simply demonstrate that a particular linkage is more effective or 
efficient in satisfying World Trade Organization members' pref­
erences and expect the members to fall in line. On an intuitive 
level, it is understood that historical and cultural barriers must be 
overcome; such barriers are the lifeblood of historical and socio­
logical institutionalism. 
An example of linkage that might be instructed by historical 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism is a linkage be­
tween trade and the environment. 1 99 Parsing the mass of litera­
ture on trade and the environment would overwhelm this Arti­
cle;200 therefore, a single, discrete example is used. Steve 
Charnovitz, who has written prodigiously and insightfully about 
198 An obvious cnttctsm is that the ineffective or inefficient institutions 
that are created, often persist, or are resistant to change, while more suitable 
alternatives do not come into effect. 
199 Reconciliation of trade policy with environmental policy is probably of 
some relevance to the survival of the international trade regime. See Robert 
Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, La­
bour and the Environment, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 38 ,  at 2 (suggesting that popular support for the international 
trade regime will evaporate tf the trade regime does not address concerns) ; 
Nichols, supra note 32,  at 702 ("Placing primacy on trade thus imperils popular 
and soveretgn support for a trade regime, and endangers all of free trade.") .  The 
infamous Tuna/Dolphin decisions, which were not even adopted by the 
GATT, is indicative of the tensions. The mere release of these deCisions, which 
exalted trade concerns over environmental concerns, led to calls for the United 
States to withdraw from the trade regime. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral 
Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L .  REV. 75 1 ,  751-
52 (1993) (describing reactions to the Tuna/Dolphin decisions) . For descrip­
tions of the Tuna/Dolphin proceedings and decisions, see Joel P. Trachtman, 
GA IT Dispute Settlement Panel, 86 AM . J .  INT'L L. 142 (1 992) . For a respected 
discussion of the many issues concerning trade and the environment (the men­
tion of which is not intended to slight the many other excellent discussions) , see 
the essays contained in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES (Kym An­
derson & Richard Blackhurst eds . ,  1992) . 
200 Cf Nichols, supra note 32, at 673 ("To bundle all of the many values re­
garding environment tnto one cohesive scheme would be a monumental, and 
probably impossible, task.") ;  Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 
NW. U. L.  REV. 1227, 1230 (1995) ("Tust listing some of the many pressing envi­
ronmental issues can lead to despondency: species extinction, deforestation, de­
sertification, toxic waste, acid rain, global climate change, and severe air and 
water pollution in large cities and poor countries. ") .  
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the relationship between law and trade/01 has advocated a funda­
mental change in the rules of the World Trade Organization-a 
change that would lead to greater participation by nongovern-
1 . . 202 . h 0 . . , 1 k . menta orgamzatwns m t e rgamzatwn s ru ema m g  proc-
ess .203 Charnovitz and others forcefully argue that nongovern­
mental organizations have demonstrably aided other international 
organizations in the creation of effective trade policy and link-
204 ,. h d Ch . ff · 1 ·  . ages . . 1n ot er wor s ,  · arnovttz o ers a ut1 1tanan argu-
ment . 205 Despite this argument, the institutional alteration that 
Charnovitz calls for has not been effected. 206 
Regime theory and institutional economics have l ittle to say 
about the failure of a proposed alteration other than that if the de-
20 1 See, e.g. , Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defog­
ging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L LT. 459 (1994) ;  Steve Charnovitz, Green 
Roots, Bad Pruning: GA TT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade 
Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L .J .  299 (1994) ;  Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Envi­
ronmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade 
PoliCJi. andA mer!can Treatymaking� 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP: L.r 25� �1 994) . - Charnov1tz uses the term nongovernmental orgamzatwns m a man­
ner that does not include businesses. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of 
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 1 8  MICH. J .  INT'L L. 1 83 ,  
1 87 1�\997) . . . . . . . . - See Steve Charnov1tz, Partzczpatzon of Nongovernmental Organzzatzons m 
the World Trade Organization, 17  U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33 1 ,  3 3 1  (1996) .  
204 See id. at 34 1  (citing NGO participation in GATT Uruguay Round) ;  A. 
Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development 
of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI . KENT L. REV. 61 (1992) . But see 
Philip M. Nichols, Realism, L iberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organiza­
tion, 17 U. PA. J .  INT'L ECON. L. 8 5 1 ,  856-60 (1996) (cautioning against relying 
on the results of nongovernmental participation in other international orgam­
zations unless it is demonstrated that that organization is comparable to the 
World Trade Organization) . 
205 See Charnovitz, supra note 203, at 341 (arguing that nongovernmental 
organization participation would facilitate negotiations) . Of course, to those 
who are ideologically predistoosed to discount environmental concerns, ignor­ing any attempts to reconci e the two issues might seem to have the greatest 
utility; given the plasticity of economic assumptions it is even possible that they 
could construct mathematical proofs for their position. See Cotter, supra note 
40, at 2 1 14 ,  2 1 1 7- 1 8  (discussing the falsifiability problem with econom1cs) . The 
point, however, is not that the World Trade Organization must embrace envi­
ronmental issues, but instead, that failure to consider environmental concerns 
endangers the continued viability of the trade regime. Cf Howse & Trebil­
cock, supra note 1 99, at 3 ("If international trade law simply rules out of court 
any trade response to the policies of other countries, however abhorrent, then 
there will be an understandable, and dangerous, temptation to declare that the 
international trade law is an ass [sic] . ") .  
206 See Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to The �ti"TO's Report on TYade 
and Environment, 14 ARIZ. J .  INT'L & COMP. L .  3 4 1 ,  34 1 -42 (1997) . 
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sired institurional alteration did not occur, it must not have been 
perceived as effective or efficient by international actors .207 His­
torical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, on the 
other hand, speak to historical constraints that must be overcome, 
cognitions that must be expanded or changed, and cultural legiti­
mations that must be elicited and made explicit. While this Arti­
cle does not purport to engage in the laborious task of applying 
the alternative institutionalisms to a specific l inkage, the useful­
ness of these theoretical schools to those who advocate practical 
linkages should be clear. 
Charnovitz does point out that the proposed International 
Trade Organization, which would have joined the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund as the third Bretton Woods 
institution if its charter had been ratified by the United States in 
1948/08 had provisions for the participation of nongovernmental 
organizations . He suggests that this means the w·orld Trade Or­
ganization should do the same.209 As a purely legal matter, of 
course, the actions of one international organization have little 
bearing on the requirements to be made of another.2 10 Historical 
institutionalism, on the other hand, does provide a theoretical jus­
tification for exploration of the history of nongovernmental or­
ganization participation. This theoretical construct, however, re­
quires more rigor than simple iteration of the history of the 
International Trade Organization. Rather, it suggests examina­
tion of at least two critical junctures: the point at which the In­
ternational Trade Organization was not created, and the point at 
which the drafters of the World Trade Organization's charter dis­
carded any plans to deeply involve nongovernmental organiza .. 
tions . Scrutinizing these critical junctures for the purpose of de-
207 See North, supra note 8 (noting that entrepreneurs change or do not 
chan�e institutions based on their perceptions of the benefits) . 2 8 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD 
TRADE DIPLOMACY 1 1 - 12  (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the history of the Interna­
tional Trade Org;mization) ;  Nichols, supra note 132, at 3 89-9 1 (same) . 
209 See Charnovitz, supra note 203 , at 338-39. Charnovitz has also written 
the definitive article on the history of nongovernmental organization participa­
tion in international organizations. See Steve Charnovitz, Two c;enturies of Par· 
tzczpatzon: NGOs and lntematzonal Governance, 1 8  l'vliCH. J .  INT L L. 1 83 (1997) . 
2 10 In general , the authority and requirements of an international organiza­
tion are bounded by its organic documents, or by a limited number of powers 
that are implied to internatlonal organizations. See Edward Gordon, The World 
Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM . J .  INT'L L. 794, 8 1 6-
2 1  (1965) ; Nichols, supra note 1 85 ,  at 723-24. 
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termining how the choices .rnade at those cleavage points possibly 
constrain future institutional choices could provide guidance for 
those who wish to effect institutional alteration. 
5 .  CONCLUSION 
Institutionalism is an increasingly useful tool in the repertoire 
of international law scholarship. Among other uses, institutional­
ism has been used to scrutinize the 'World Trade Organization. 
Institutionalism, as it is used in international law scholarship, 
however, reflects only two sources: regime theory from interna­
tional relations theory, and institutional economics from the so­
cial science of economics . Regime theory and institutional eco­
nomics, however, do not exhaust the universe of possible sources 
for models of institutional analysis .  This Article offers two ex­
amples of other models for institutional analysis : historical insti­
tutionalism from political science, and sociological institutional­
ism from sociology. Neither school of institutionalism has been 
used to analyze the World Trade Organization. 
Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
differ from regime theory and institutional economics in funda­
mental ways. To the international trade law scholar who is seek­
ing models for analysis, these differences should not be looked 
upon as reasons to discredit one school or another, but instead as 
opportunities to examine international law from a variety of per­
spectives, or even to hybridize in legal analysis the strengths of 
several other disciplines while pruning their weaker analytical 
principles. As this Article briefly demonstrates, historical institu­
tionalism and sociological institutionalism can lead to new in­
sights concerning the World Trade Organization. 
\)'/bile trade scholars should appreciate the possibility of new 
tools of analysis, the existence of these tools raises an interesting 
question concerning why some forms of institutionalism have 
been used in trade scholarshio and others have not. In order to 
j_ 
answer that question, scholars must recognize that trade scholar-
ship itself is an institution, and is subject to the same scnltiny as 
the World Trade Organization. By examining how analytical 
linkages occur or do not occur in trade scholarship, lessons can be 
learned that have applicability to the broader questions of theo­
retical and pract ical linkage to the '1Y/ orld Trade Organization. 
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